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Self-Help Groups as Financial
Institutions
Policy Implications Using a
Financial Model
by R. Srinivasan
Abstract: This paper uses a spreadsheet financial model to identify key
financial policy parameters that influence the performance of self-help
groups (SHGs) whose primary activity is microfinance. The focus is on
long-run (ten-year) performance. There is bad news for those policy makers
and practitioners who focus unduly on growth as measured by loan
activity. A conservative financial policy that does not inject external
funds into the SHG in the initial years and, when it does,
does so with moderation, seems appropriate in the long run. Additionally,
a high loan interest rate policy produces SHGs that are strong financial
institutions.

T

his paper uses a spreadsheet financial model to identify
key financial policy parameters that influence the performance of self-help groups (SHGs) that have microfinance as a major activity. It also examines the consequences
of a conservative financial policy and of a high interest rate
policy at the SHG level. It is assumed that these SHGs operate
under the umbrella of a microcredit institution (MCI). 1 The
conclusions, based as they are on a simulation model and not
on field evidence are, hopefully, useful.
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While some issues at the MCI level are discussed, the central purpose of this paper is to enhance understanding of
SHGs. As a by-product, the model can be used by an individual MCI in its planning process. However, this model is simply
not designed as a substitute for a comprehensive planner, such
as Microfin. 2 In other words my concern is with SHGs; my
focus on the MCI is to ensure that the understanding of SHGs
is within an understanding of the total system. 3
A disclaimer is in order here. I am conscious that a successful microfinance program may not appropriately be viewed
as a “financial institution” activity alone. The importance of
social relations and institutional features is stressed in
Woolcock (1999). I recognize the importance of these but
also believe that creating good financial institutions qua financial institutions does contribute to the success of such programs. I, therefore, proceed to look at SHGs and MCIs solely
as financial institutions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The first section provides a brief description of the SHG-MCI system and
describes the financial model used. The second contains an
analysis of the policy implications of the financial model output, with SHG “best practices” as a point of reference. The
third section concludes the paper.

Financial Modeling Self-Helf Groups
SHG-MCI System
A typical SHG consists of twelve to thirty members
(Rutherford, 2000). The group is not merely a savings and loan
association, but serves as an “affinity” group that provides a
platform for a range of issues (such as watershed development,
awareness building, and family planning—see Fernandez, 1994,
for a comprehensive description of such SHGs). An SHG
meets regularly (often weekly), and in these meetings,
R. Srinivasan is professor and coordinator of the Finance & Control Area at the Indian
Institute of Management, Bangalore. Email: rsrini@iimb.ernet.in
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members contribute savings and take decisions on loans to
members of the group. Group leadership is by rotation. The
SHG may initially lend out of its own pool of funds and after
gaining some experience with lending (and recovering loans), it
may borrow from an MCI for on-lending to members.
Briefly, the SHG-MCI system has financial linkages as follows. Each SHG in the system raises funds from individual
members and borrows from the MCI. Each SHG lends to members and saves with the MCI. I will assume that there are no
regulatory restrictions 4 on the SHG activities. The MCI raises
funds from three sources: capital, SHG savings, and borrowings from outside. The MCI lends to SHGs, invests outside,
and maintains a cash balance. The MCI may have regulatory
restrictions on assets, liabilities, and interest rates.

Financial Model
The spreadsheet financial model 5 (created in Microsoft Excel)
was developed to analyze possible strategies using what-if
analysis. The model generates two sets of outputs: SHG-level
and MCI-level projections. The model generates these projections based on input values provided for a number of factors at
SHG and MCI level.
A stylized description of the functioning of SHGs and the
MCI is provided, with the various input assumptions. To simplify computation, a month has been taken as the standard
interval. Thus members save monthly, repay in monthly
installments, and so on.
Financial Model Inputs: SHG
• An SHG is formed by an initial set of members and the
group remains constant. (Initial membership fees are
ignored; they make little difference to the model output.)
• Each member saves a specified amount with the SHG. The
SHG pays interest on this amount. The members’ saving
should desirably be regular, but in practice it is often irregular (not all members may save in a given month or there may
Volume 5 Number 1
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•

•

•

•

•

be a shortfall in the individual saving quantum). The model
incorporates some irregularity in savings (this is not any
implied defense of irregularity).
A loan cycle represents the repayment period of a loan to
members made by the SHG. The model accepts loan cycles
ranging from 1 to 24 months. The SHG accumulates savings
over the first loan cycle and maintains this with the MCI
(i.e., no lending is done in the first loan cycle).
Thereafter, the SHG lends a fraction of the available funds to
members over several loan cycles (referred to as the self-cycle
phase). The balance is saved with the MCI. The loan to members is repayable in monthly instalments over the loan cycle
period. Interest is paid monthly over the loan cycle. A fraction of the loans are delinquent with members taking three
months more than the loan cycle to repay. Of these, a fraction will default; defaulting members pay neither interest
nor principal.
At the end of the self-cycle phase, the SHG raises funds from
the MCI and lends a fraction of the total available funds
(member savings, surplus retained, and borrowing from
MCI) to members. The balance is saved with the MCI. The
loan from the MCI can be back-to-back (i.e., identical in
tenor to the SHG loan to members), or range for periods
from 1 to 24 months.
The SHG incurs an annual operating cost expressed as a fraction of the common fund (member savings plus accumulated
operating surplus).
The SHG makes annual profits (losses) that add to (reduce)
the accumulated surplus.

Financial Model Inputs: MCI
• The MCI starts with a certain capital base. It can raise a
multiplier of this capital and accumulated surplus by
borrowing from outside.
• The MCI adds SHGs over a period of five years. The number
of SHGs stabilizes thereafter.

4
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• The MCI has to maintain a minimum fraction of its borrowing and SHG savings as cash and maintain another minimum
fraction in approved investments. The remaining funds are
available for lending to the SHGs. A fraction of the loans to
SHGs are delinquent and a smaller fraction default.
• The MCI incurs an annual operating cost expressed as a fraction of its borrowings plus SHG savings.
• The MCI makes annual profits (losses) that increase (reduce)
the total accumulated surplus.
The MCI capital is not an input item. The model generates
annual capital requirements (consistent with the inputs) as an
output. 6 Table 1 contains the definitions of inputs based on
these assumptions.

Financial Model: Output
The model produces the following output at SHG and MCI
levels:
• Balance sheets for 10 years.
• Income statements for 10 years and an aggregate income
statement for the 10-year period.
• Financial analysis.
• Sensitivity analysis.
In addition, funds flow statements for 10 years and an aggregate funds flow statement for the 10-year period are produced
at the SHG level

Policy Implications
Table 1 contains definitions of inputs and numerical values for
the base case. I do not claim that the base numbers are realistic,
although many of these numbers are in the realm of possibility
in India. A deliberate major deviation from realism has been
made at the SHG level. The interest rate that the SHG charges
on loan to members is, at 20% on outstanding balances, unrealistic. The number chosen is convenient, as it straddles
the 10% or so-called “politically correct” interest rates that a
Volume 5 Number 1
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financial institution would have been compelled to charge in
India and the 30% plus rate that SHGs actually use. 7 There has
been fear expressed that a government that seeks to regulate
microfinance may impose ceilings on interest rates making
microfinance unsustainable (Peck & Rosenberg, 2000). Use of
this intermediate rate of interest of 20% is to help highlight the
positive contribution to organization performance that a
higher rate of interest can make.
A good benchmark for understanding some of these inputs
is provided by Mysore Resettlement and Development Agency
(MYRADA). The financial criteria for SHGs rated as “good” 8
by MYRADA include the following: At least 95% of members
save the minimum stipulated amount per month. At least 95%
repay against demand. The common fund (the total pool of
funds from members consisting of deposits and surplus
retained in the SHG) is rotated at least 100%. There is no idle
capital and there should be minimum balances with the MCI.
Good practices also require that when an SHG seeks MCI
credit, the SHG will have run at least one self-cycle. Internal
over-dues should not be more than 15% of total outstanding
loan amount. The savings to borrowing ratio should not be
more than 1:3. MYRADA compares borrowing with savings.
This model compares borrowing with the entire common fund
(member savings plus accumulated operating surplus). The
MYRADA ratio of 1:3 is roughly equal to the borrowing
multiplier of 1:2, which I used. 9
With these base numbers, sensitivity analysis provides certain implications. I have divided these into three categories:
key financial policy parameters (essentially focusing on the relative importance of input assumptions), the “cost” of financial
conservatism at SHG level, and the consequences of a “highinterest” rate lending policy at the SHG level.
Sensitivities are specified with respect to a set of measures
of performance, at SHG and MCI levels, measured after 10
years. (The spreadsheet provides an intermediate sensitivity
analysis after five years, but that will not be used in this paper.)
6
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Table 2 contains the definition of output financial measures
used in this paper.
At the SHG level, these include a measure of total
resources (SHG funds); two measures of cumulative operating
performance (SHG surplus) and the proportion of cumulative
surplus to the total common fund (SHG surplus/common
fund); and two measures of lending performance, cumulative
loan disbursements (SHG loan disbursed to members) and
lending in a year relative to the common fund (SHG common
fund rotation).
At the MCI level, these include a measure of total
resources (MCI total assets); a measure of cumulative operating
performance (MCI surplus); a measure of capital requirements
(MCI capital) and a return on capital measure (MCI return on
equity—MCI ROE). 10

Key Financial Policy Parameters
Table 3 (Panel A) contains output from a sensitivity analysis. I
realize the problems of comparing deviations from base case
(for instance, is a 1% increase in the loan interest rate to members at par with a 1% increase in the members’ loan delinquency rate?). Since a large number of input and output
measures are used, the corresponding input from Table 1 (output) and Table 2 (item number) is provided in parentheses in
the analysis below. The input assumptions in Table 3 exclude a
number of items in Table 1 that are unimportant in a financial
sense (in that the output measures are insensitive to changes in
these items). The broad implications are as follows.
For SHGs, the SHG funds (O1) and the SHG surplus (O2)
are strongly determined by default of SHG members (I12), the
loan interest rate to members (I07), the loan interest rate
charged by MCI on its lending to the SHG (I20), the SHG
operating cost (I09), and the SHG borrowing multiplier from
MCI (I06). SHG loan disbursed to members (O4) is additionally influenced by the length of the loan cycle (I05). The
pool of funds available with the SHG and, therefore, its lendable resources are influenced strongly by the amount of money
Volume 5 Number 1
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the SHG borrows from the MCI and the annual surplus the
SHG makes. This surplus is in turn determined by the rate of
interest at which the SHG lends, the rate of interest at which
it borrows, default by members, and the operating cost of the
SHG.
Further insight is provided by Table 3 (Panel B) where
sensitivity is “normalized” by looking at changes required to
produce the same increase (roughly 13%) in SHG loan disbursed to members (O4). The loan interest rate charged by the
SHG to members (I07), the loan interest rate charged by the
MCI to the SHG (I20), SHG operating cost (I09), and default
by members (I12) all produce similar impacts on SHG Funds
(O1), 11 SHG Surplus (O2), SHG surplus/common fund (O3),
and SHG loan disbursed to members (O4). This is unsurprising
since all act through the income statement. Increasing the SHG
borrowing multiplier from MCI (I06) leads to smaller surpluses, as does reducing the SHG savings rate (I03). Again this
is expected: both of these lead to an immediate increase in
funds available for disbursement as loans to members without
adding significantly to operating surplus. Reducing the loan
cycle (I05) adversely impacts surplus because of the assumption
that delinquent loans are delayed by three months, irrespective
of the original tenor of the loan.
At the MCI level, the MCI surplus is strongly influenced
by default, either by SHGs or by members (I12 and I24 respectively), by the MCI borrowing multiplier from outside (I14),
the SHG borrowing multiplier from MCI (I06), and the loan
interest rate charged by MCI on its lending to the SHG (I20).
Beyond this brief summary, I do not intend to discuss MCI
level output.

Financial Conservatism at SHG level
The building blocks of a conservative financial policy at the
SHG level include self-financing loan cycle (I08), the borrowing multiplier from MCI (I06), and the SHG savings rate with
the MCI (I03—the fraction of SHG funds with the MCI, serving as a self-imposed reserve requirement). By conservative I
8
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mean what would be described as prudential in mainstream
banking. A longer self-financing cycle would put the members’
money at risk but not the outsiders’. A lower borrowing multiplier from the MCI again would put less of the outsiders’
money at risk. A higher SHG savings rate with the MCI
reduces the loan exposure to members. This, in the context of
an SHG, matters less as will discussed later on.
The self-financing cycle (I08) does not influence the SHG
operations in a major way. Reducing the cycle to 1, from the
base of 2, increases SHG loans disbursed to members (O4) by
1.64%. Increasing the cycle to 3 from the base of 2 reduces
loans disbursed by 2.55%. 12 Thus if there is a strong belief that
operating with their own money initially can establish desirable group processes within the SHG, there is no operational
reason to hurry.
The SHG savings rate (I03) does make a difference to SHG
performance. For instance, reducing the savings rate from 10%
to 5.6% (see Table 3, Panel B) has the same impact on SHG
loan disbursed to members (O4) as increasing the SHG loan
interest rate to members by 1%. However, an SHG is not like
other banks where the pool of depositors and the pool of
borrowers do not overlap. In such banks, a “reserve” requirement offers some protection for the depositors. In the case of
an SHG, the pool of depositors and of borrowers would be coterminus in the long run. In a sense, to talk of a “reserve”
availability is devoid of meaning. Borrowing from the MCI and
saving with the MCI are both essentially the same net activity
(except that a deposit can make cash available in an
emergency).
Increasing the borrowing multiplier (I06) from 2 to 3
increases the loans disbursed to members (O3) by 57% and the
SHG surplus (O2) by 46% (Table 3, Panel C). But all it takes is
an increase in loan default by members (I12) by 0.4% to effectively leave the surplus at the base level. 13 In other words, if an
increase in lending to members is accompanied by even a small
increase in default, then the SHG surplus remains at the same
Volume 5 Number 1
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level as with a lower lending volume. Raising the multiplier to
4 increases the loans disbursed to members (O3) by 134% and
the SHG surplus (O2) by 105%. But again all it takes is an
increase in the loan default by members (I12) by 0.7% to effectively leave the surplus at base level.
With a borrowing multiplier of 3, default of about 3.2% is
enough to wipe out the entire SHG surplus (O2). In the base
case, default of about 3.4% would use up the entire SHG surplus (O2). Unlike in the previous paragraph, we are dealing
here with the entire SHG surplus (and not just incremental
over the base level). This and the previous paragraph taken
together imply the following: higher lending volumes will lead
to a higher SHG surplus if default levels can be maintained at
base level. A slightly higher-than-base level default will wipe
out any SHG surplus gains from increased lending. With
higher lending volumes, defaults hurt the SHG more than with
lower lending volumes. As a consequence, the overall SHG surplus can be exhausted entirely at lower default rates than at the
base level of lending. While loan portfolio quality is always
important, increasing the borrowing multiplier makes the need
for assuring quality of the loan portfolio even more important.
The implication of this for the organizations involved, both
SHGS and the MCI, is examined below.
The quality of the loan portfolio of an MCI is a function
of three factors. The first is the loan absorptive capacity of
individual SHG members, their ability to deploy loan funds
(and indeed their own funds) effectively in their individual
businesses. Business development interventions address this.
The second is the effectiveness of loan management at the SHG
level, reflecting the quality of the SHG’s loan appraisal,
disbursement, monitoring, and recovery activities. The third is
the effectiveness of loan management at the MCI level. Thus
any planned growth of the loan activity has to ensure that
these three factors are addressed. There is some evidence that
mature SHG programs have a higher average portfolio at risk
(PAR greater than 60 days—measured at MCI level) than new
10

Volume 5 Number 1

Self-Help Groups as Financial Institutions

programs (M-CRIL, 2001). This could possibly imply that the
third factor, the effectiveness of loan management at the MCI
level, has been less than adequately addressed. However, given
the relatively brief history of even the so-called mature programs in India, I would hesitate to cite this as clinching
evidence that loan management effectiveness falls as the size of
the loan portfolio increases. But there is a cautionary tale here;
growth for both SHGs and an MCI makes loan portfolio
quality an overriding concern.

A High Interest Rate Policy
A high interest rate on the loans to members (I07) not only
dramatically increases (see Table 3, Panel C) the loans disbursed to members (O4), but also enhances the SHG Surplus
(O2). Thus, an increase from the base interest rate of 20% to
30% increases loans disbursed to members (O4) by 291% and
the SHG surplus (O2) by 894%. The loan default has to go up
to 7.2% to wipe out the surplus. Rutherford (2000) provides an
insightful analysis of interest rates and growth rates in the context of an ASCA. Essentially, a high interest rate policy (keeping default rates constant) can rapidly add to the SHG surplus
and, therefore, to the pool of funds available for lending. This
drives growth. A high interest rate policy (within reasonable
limits) not only facilitates growth, but can provide a cushion
for default by building the SHG surplus.
It is important to note that the SHG, in this model, is
viable even with a 20% rate of interest. In this case an increase
to 30% is not based on a need to meet transaction costs. It is
based on the premise that the enhanced surplus, derived from
a higher interest rate, can strengthen the pool of funds members have with the group and promote growth based on owned
funds.
The issues are two-fold: with high interest rates, will there
be enough takers of loans, and do such high interest rates breed
default? There is considerable empirical support that low interest rates can indeed damage the credit environment. Adams
(1984) and Von Pischke (1991) argue that the essential issue is
Volume 5 Number 1
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not whether credit is cheap, but who has access to financial services and what does it cost to provide these services. Rosenberg
(1996) provides a justification of a high-interest rate policy,
contending that “There is overwhelming empirical evidence
that huge numbers of poor borrowers can indeed pay interest
rates at a level high enough to support microfinance institution
sustainability.” This would support the model’s assumption
that there will be takers for loans at high interest rates, but
with the three factors that affect loan quality, listed in the previous section, addressed. The truth is more complex; high
interest rates that are still lower than in the informal sector
may strengthen SHGs but render them less useful for the very
poor.
Given that even these high rates are usually lower than
rates prevailing in the informal sector, I would argue that too
low an interest rate may even tempt a member to borrow from
the SHG, not for production/consumption within her household, but for on-lending in the informal market, possibly
increasing the loan portfolio risk considerably.
On the whole, a high interest rate policy may be justified
not on the grounds of transaction costs alone, but from the
financial strength of the SHG derived from enhanced surplus
creation and retention.

Conclusion
For policy makers and MCI managers involved with SHGs, the
central message is to not be in a hurry. SHGs are somewhat
fragile (as indeed are most financial institutions), and a small
reduction in the loan portfolio quality can seriously damage it.
In the first few years of an SHG, institutionalizing group
processes is much more important than accelerating lending.
Size is as much an issue as quality. Over a sustained period, an
emphasis on growth is probably unwise and unwarranted.
At an operational level, this paper attempts to enhance
awareness of the relationship between decisions on interest
rates and borrowing multipliers (and the entire list of items
described here as input assumptions), and outcomes, such as
operating surplus, funds, and loan disbursement.

12
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Notes
1. This shows that I started on this paper some time back before microcredit
enlarged in scope and became microfinance. I find the thought of making
changes in a range-named EXCEL file alarming, so please bear with me.
2. See the CGAP website: http://www.cgap.org/html/mfis_technical_
guides.html. Again, for those whose concern is the financial performance of the
MCI, the microCAMEL website http://www.gdrc.org/icm/micro-camel.html is
a good source.
3. For instance, default by an SHG is, in a shortsighted sense, good for the
SHG, but not good for an MCI at all.
4. Peck and Rosenberg (2000) discuss the regulation of microfinance institutions, including small-community based ones.
5. The model is accessible at http://202.41.106.14/~rsrini/shgmodel.xls.
Feel free to use or adapt with acknowledgement. Remember that it is a research
model, not a practitioner’s one.
6. Because capital is an output, the MCI operating cost is dependent on borrowing and SHG savings and not on capital. This ensures that the model has no
circular references.
7. Also, many SHGs do not pay any interest on members’ savings with them,
while I have assumed an interest payment.
8. While I have focused on the financial measures, MYRADA provides a
number of other measures.
9. India’s National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development
(NABARD) stipulates a higher 1: 4 ratio. Both the NABARD and the MYRADA
guidelines are available on Hari Srinivasan’s fascinating website:
http://www.gdrc.org/icm/.
10. The MicroBanking Standards Project [http://www.microbankingmbb.org/] provides a number of measures intended primarily at the MCI level.
With my focus on SHGs, I have attempted a short list of measures that capture
size, viability, and lending activity.
11. These MCI measures are comparable to those in the “Microfinance definitions draft for comment,” in the website http://www.microrate.com/. What is
called “Surplus” in this paper is referred to as “Retained Earnings” in the draft
definitions.
12. I would like to downplay default by members. I would hate to mislead
any reader into associating default positively with good performance.
13. These results are not in the table.
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Interest rate [annual] paid on borrowings from SHG by members

SHG annual operating cost as a percentage of the common fund, at year-end

Percentage of scheduled savings by members deposited

Percentage of loan disbursed to members, whose repayment is delayed

Percentage of loan disbursed to members, in default [should be less than item I12]

Fixed assets of MCI

I09 SHG: Operating cost

I10 Members: Savings regularity

I11 Members: Loan delinquency

I12 Members: Loan default

I13 MCI: Fixed Assets

Multiplier of common fund [member savings plus surplus]that SHG can borrow from the MCI 2.0

I06 SHG: Borrowing multiplier from MCI

Number of loan-cycles over which SHG lends to members without borrowing from the MCI

Scheduled repayment period [months] of loan by SHG to members

I05 SHG: Loan cycle

I08 SHG: Self-ﬁnancing cycle

Interest rate [annual] paid on members’ savings by SHG

I04 SHG: Savings-intrate to members

I07 SHG: Loan-intrate to members

Percentage of total funds saved with the MCI

I03 SHG: Savings rate

100000

1.0%

5.0%

95.0%

4.0%

2.0

20.0%

10

5.0%

10.0%

40

Average monthly savings per member

20

Value

I02 Members: Monthly Savings

Deﬁnition

Number of members in SHG, throughout the plan period.

Item

I01 Members: Number

No.

Item

Table 1. Input Definitions and Base-Case Values

Rs

%

%

%

%

No.

%

Times

Months

%

%

Rs

No.

Dimension

Percentage of loan disbursed to SHGs by the MCI, whose repayment is delayed

Percentage of loan disbursed to SHGs by the MCI, in default [should be less than item I23]

Number of SHGs added annually

I24 SHG: Loan default

I25 MCI: SHG addition

I22 MCI: Loan cycle

I23 SHG: Loan delinquency

MCI annual operating cost as a percentage of total borrowing and SHG savings, at year-end

Scheduled repayment period [months] of loan by the MCI to SHGs

I21 MCI: Operating cost

Interest rate [annual] earned on investments by MCI

Interest rate [annual] paid on savings of SHGs by MCI

I18 MCI: Savings-intrate to SHG

Interest rate [annual] paid on borrowings from the MCI by SHGs

Interest rate [annual] paid on borrowings from outside by MCI

I17 MCI: Borrowing-intrate from outside

I20 MCI: Loan-intrate to SHG

Minimum cash that MCI must maintain as a percentage of borrowing and deposits

I16 MCI: Cash

I19 MCI: Investment-intrate

Minimum investment that MCI must maintain as a percentage of borrowings and deposits

I15 MCI: Minimum investment

Deﬁnition

Multiplier of net worth [capital plus surplus] that MCI can borrow

Item

I14 MCI: Borrowing multiplier from outside

No.

Item

Table 1 Cont’d.

100

1.0%

5.0%

10

4.0%

15.0%

9.0%

5.0%

10.0%

5.0%

20.0%

1.0

Value

No.

%

%

Months

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

Times

Dimension

SHG funds

SHG surplus

SHG surplus/common fund

SHG loans disbursed to members

SHG common fund rotation

MCI total assets

MCI surplus

MCI capital

MCI return on equity

O2

O3

O4

O5

O6

O7

O8

O9

Item

O1

Item No.

Table 2. Output Definitions

Measure of size
Cumulative profits earned and retained (corresponds to reserves in standard accounting parlance)
Measure of cumulative operating performance
The common fund is member savings plus surplus
The common fund is a measure of the members’ stake in the SHG
The SHG surplus/common fund is a measure of the proportion of this stake from operating surplus
Cumulative value of loans disbursed to members
Measure of absolute cumulative lending performance
Loans disbursed in a period divided by the average common fund
Measure of relative periodic lending performance
Total assets of MCI
Measure of size
Cumulative profits earned and retained (corresponds to reserves in standard accounting parlance)
Measure of cumulative operating performance
Capital
Measure of capital requirement
MCI surplus divided by MCI equity (capital plus surplus)
Measure of return on capital employed

Total assets of SHG

Definition

Table 3. Sensitivity Analysis

Item
No.

Item

INPUT
base

SHG
INPUT
new

Funds
O1

Panel A
I07
I20
I04
I18
I06
I14
I03
I10
I05
I08
I09
I21
I11
I12
I23
I24

SHG: Loan-intrate to members
MCI: Loan-intrate to SHG
SHG: Savings-intrate to members
MCI: Savings-intrate to SHG
SHG: Borrowing multiplier from MCI
MCI: Borrowing multiplier from outside
SHG: Savings rate
Members: Savings regularity
SHG: Loan cycle
SHG: Self-financing cycle
SHG: Operating cost
MCI: Operating cost
Members: Loan delinquency
Members: Loan default
SHG: Loan delinquency
SHG: Loan default

20%
15%
5%
5%
2.00
1.00
10%
95%
10
2
4%
4%
5%
1%
5%
1%

21%
14%
4%
6%
2.10
1.10
9%
96%
11
3
3%
3%
4%
0%
4%
0%

19.00%
13.54%
4.27%
2.04%
5.81%
0.00%
2.44%
1.05%
2.65%
-2.56%
6.94%
0.00%
0.71%
51.85%
-0.37%
-25.20%

20%
15%
5%
2.00
10%
10
4%
1%
1%

21.00%
13.62%
1.13%
2.25
5.6%
8
1.47%
0.57%
1.56%

19.00%
19.20%
16.51%
14.95%
11.23%
-7.38%
18.62%
19.42%
18.74%

20%
2

30%
3

529.01%
69.33%

Panel B
I07
I20
I04
I06
I03
I05
I09
I12
I24

SHG: Loan-intrate to members
MCI: Loan-intrate to SHG
SHG: Savings-intrate to members
SHG: Borrowing multiplier from MCI
SHG: Savings rate
SHG: Loan cycle
SHG: Operating cost
Members: Loan default
SHG: Loan default
Panel C

I07 SHG: Loan-intrate to members
I06 SHG: Borrowing multiplier from MCI

Note: Columns O1 to O8 indicate the percentage change over the base case value,
column O9 indicates the change from the base case return on net worth (Years 6 to
10) of 8.10%.

Item
no.

SHG
surplus/
SHG common
surplus
fund
O2
O3

SHG
loan disbursed to
members
O4

SHG
common
fund
rotation
O5

MCI
total
assets
O6

MCI
surplus
O7

MCI
capital
O8

MCI
ROE
O9

I07
I20
I04
I18
I06
I14
I03
I10
I05
I08
I09
I21
I11
I12
I23
I24

32.11%
22.89%
7.21%
3.45%
4.05%
0.00%
4.12%
1.05%
4.48%
-4.32%
11.74%
0.00%
1.20%
87.65%
-0.62%
-42.61%

11.02%
8.23%
2.82%
1.38%
1.61%
0.00%
1.64%
0.00%
1.78%
-1.81%
4.48%
0.00%
0.49%
23.57%
-0.26%
-23.26%

12.89%
9.16%
3.34%
1.45%
5.02%
0.00%
2.81%
1.05%
-6.37%
-4.18%
4.88%
0.00%
0.74%
33.34%
-0.25%
-18.17%

0.56%
0.41%
0.08%
0.06%
3.41%
0.00%
1.19%
0.00%
-7.59%
0.02%
0.21%
0.00%
0.27%
0.23%
-0.01%
-0.92%

15.07%
10.74%
3.72%
1.66%
6.98%
0.60%
1.77%
1.05%
1.95%
-2.69%
5.62%
0.00%
0.57%
40.64%
-0.30%
-20.88%

9.27%
-16.54%
2.75%
-2.31%
6.41%
-7.99%
1.98%
1.06%
-0.89%
-7.02%
3.66%
17.07%
0.36%
24.78%
0.44%
29.02%

15.29%
12.97%
3.75%
1.97%
7.26%
-3.81%
3.33%
1.05%
1.99%
-2.68%
5.69%
-1.42%
0.58%
41.27%
-0.35%
-24.58%

-0.15%
-1.78%
-0.03%
-0.27%
-0.03%
-0.29%
-0.07%
0.00%
-0.06%
-0.12%
-0.05%
1.29%
-0.01%
-0.34%
0.05%
4.17%

I07
I20
I04
I06
I03
I05
I09
I12
I24

32.11%
32.46%
27.90%
10.32%
18.98%
-12.47%
31.48%
32.82%
31.67%

11.02%
11.12%
9.78%
3.97%
6.97%
-5.50%
10.84%
11.23%
10.90%

12.89%
12.92%
12.93%
12.82%
12.92%
15.03%
12.94%
12.87%
12.82%

0.56%
0.57%
0.28%
8.54%
5.25%
20.18%
0.52%
0.09%
0.54%

15.07%
15.17%
14.41%
17.89%
8.06%
-5.72%
14.95%
15.53%
14.94%

9.27%
-23.53%
10.66%
16.30%
9.00%
-0.04%
9.60%
9.80%
-22.45%

15.29%
18.35%
14.53%
18.63%
15.41%
-5.82%
15.16%
15.76%
17.97%

-0.15%
-2.45%
-0.09%
-0.07%
-0.28%
0.13%
-0.14%
-0.15%
-2.36%

I07
I06

894.24%
45.64%

58.06% 291.50%
14.68% 57.27%

5.52% 358.92% 168.15% 368.11%
34.36% 81.43% 70.95% 84.95%

-1.59%
-0.25%

SHG-Bank Linkage Program in
India
An Overview
by Hema Bansal
Abstract: The formal financial institutions in India have ventured into
microfinance in a massive way by adopting the SHG-Bank Linkage Program
model. The present paper makes an attempt to review the performance of
the program in different states of India and across three major institutions—commercial banks, cooperatives, and the regional rural banks. The study
also presents vital information about the leading NGOs with major credit
linkages in Indian states.

T

his study attempts to review the spread of credit linkages between self-help groups (SHGs) and banks across
credit delivery models adapted by the Reserve Bank of
India (RBI) and the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural
Development (NABARD). It further examines the spread of
credit linkages across different regions and states of India. It
also reviews the participation of commercial banks, regional
rural banks, and cooperatives in the SHG-Bank Linkage
Program across different states in India.
The analytical section of the paper is divided in five parts.
The first section reviews the spread of self-help group linkages
to banks across three different models that have been adopted
by the National Bank to route credit to SHGs. The second

Journal of Microfinance

section assesses the coverage of SHG linkages for three years
from 1997–98 to 1999–2000 and reviews their spread across
regions. The third section studies the distribution of SHGs
across states and union territories of India. It also uses correlations to understand the relationship between poverty, human
development, and the spread of NGOs in Indian states. The
fourth section studies the state-by-state participation of commercial banks, regional rural banks, and cooperatives and provides a brief backdrop of these institutions. The fifth section
identifies the non-government organizations/self-help promoting institutions with maximum SHG credit linkages and presents some preliminary information about these organizations.
The study is based on secondary data published by the
NABARD in India. Out of the 114,775 SHGs credit linked to
banks, 94,645 were refinanced by NABARD and accounted for
83% of the total SHGs linked from the inception of the program until March 2000. As the data for all the SHGs credit
linked to banks was not available, we have based our study on
SHGs refinanced by NABARD. Considering that they formed
83% of the total SHGs credit linked, it is assumed that results
derived from the analysis are likely to hold true for all SHGs.
By 2000, the SHG-bank linkage program had established linkages in the states of Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, Haryana,
Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura,
Sikkim, Manipur, Orissa, Bihar, West Bengal, Madhya
Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Goa, Andhra
Pradesh Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu, the Union
Territory of Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and the Union
Territory of Pondichery; hence the analysis is limited to these
areas.

Dr Hema Bansal is an Assistant Professor in Banking and Business Finance at the M. S.
University of Baroda, Gujarat, India. E-mail: bansalsmsu@satyam.net.in
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The Background
Out of around one billion people in India, 26% are poor
(National Statistical Sample Organization, 2000). At the bottom the poor need credit for small productive assets, working
capital, housing, illness, and emergencies. The demand for
credit here is not only large but heterogeneous as well. Till the
1990s the rural financial system in India was predominantly
supply driven with the state playing a major role in improving
the access to financial services by the poor. While state intervention considerably improved the outreach of the banking
system and expanded rural credit, it also allowed rent seeking
tendencies and credit indiscipline to grow (Nanda, 2000). By
the late 1980s, the rural financial system had virtually collapsed amid heavy regulations, distraught market conditions,
dual lines of control, and mounting arrears. The beginning of
1990 saw India face one of its worst balance of payment crises.
In 1991, under the initiative of the International Monetary
Fund, India undertook a liberalization of its economy.
Liberalization had an important bearing on the financial sector; banks, which had turned weak, were confronted with the
challenge of making themselves profitable while maintaining
their prudential requirements and competing with private and
foreign banks in a new liberalized milieu.
At this time, the rural credit system needed a fresh
approach that could induce rationalization of the processes,
policy, and regulations and consequently increase returns.
Around this time, Asian countries like Bangladesh, Indonesia,
Sri Lanka, and Thailand and Latin American countries like
Bolivia, Cambodia, and Chile were effectively adopting the
new microfinance approach. One of the reasons for the universal popularity of the approach was the extraordinary repayment rate of 95% and more. The extraordinary repayment
rates of the microfinance institutions (MFIs) provided the
required “leverage” for transforming poverty alleviation exercises into business opportunities.
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In India, the adaptation of the new microfinance approach
by rural financial institutions assumed the form of the “SelfHelp Group–Bank Linkage Program.” After an initial pilot
study the RBI set up a working group on non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and SHGs. The working group made
recommendations for internalization of the SHG concept as a
potential intervention tool in the area of banking with the
poor. The RBI was quick to accept the recommendations and
advised the banks to consider mainstreaming lending to SHGs
as part of their rural credit operations.
The SHG-bank linkage program is gaining increasing
acceptance amongst NGO community and bankers. The
NABARD envisions covering one third of the rural population
in India by establishing one million SHGs. The government of
India has already made announcements for linking 200,000
SHGs by year 2002–03. The task force on microfinance sees the
SHG-bank linkage program emerging as a major way of banking with the poor in coming years. It is estimated that at least
25,000 bank branches, 4000 NGOs, and 2000 federations of
SHGs involving 0.10 million personnel of these institutions
will be involved in scaling up microfinance to this magnitude.
Under the SHG-bank linkage program, NGOs and banks
interact with the poor, especially women, to form small
homogenous groups. These small groups are encouraged to
meet frequently and collect small thrift amounts from their
members and are taught simple accounting methods to enable
them to maintain their accounts. Although individually these
poor could never have enough savings to open a bank account,
the pooled savings enable them to open a formal bank account
in the name of the group. This is the first step in establishing
links with the formal banking system. Groups then, meet often
and use the pooled thrift to impart small loans to members for
meeting their small emergent needs. This saves them from usurious debt traps and thus begins their empowerment through
group dynamics, decision-making, and funds management.
Gradually the pooled thrift grows and soon they are ready to
24
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receive external funds in multiples of their group savings.
Bank loans enable the group members to undertake incomegenerating activities.
There are several advantages of the group lending setup.
For one, rather than a bank, borrowers themselves undertake
the task of credit evaluation; this creates a peer screening effect
and reduces the transaction costs as community members have
much better information than banks (Andersen and Nina,
1998). Two, there is the peer monitoring effect that induces
group members to use their loans in productive ways; Stiglitz
(1990), Varain (1990), and Banerjee and Newman (1994) have
developed models that illustrate the working of the peer monitoring effect. Three, the desire to preserve valuable social ties
induces borrowers to spend extra effort if necessary to secure
timely payments. Social ties are valuable because they allow
members to borrow in the future and provide business connections. Moreover, a very important feature of group lending is
the collateral effect. Bank’s losses incurred due to unsuccessful
projects are generally reduced as successful entrepreneurs
within each group cover part of their losses (Andersen and
Nina, 1998).
Through the SHG-bank linkage program the RBI and
NABARD have tried to promote relationship banking, i.e.,
improving the existing relationship between the poor and
bankers with the social intermediation of NGOs. The Indian
model is predominantly a “Linkage Model,” which draws upon
the strengths of various partners: NGOs, who are best in mobilizing the poor and building their capacities, and bankers,
whose financial strength is financing. As compared to other
countries where parallel model of lending to the poor is predominant, the Indian linkage model tries to use the existing
formal financial network to increase the outreach to the poor,
while ensuring the necessary flexibility of operations for both
bankers and the poor. Various credit delivery innovations such
as Grameen Bank Replications, NGO networking, credit
unions, and SHG federations have been encouraged by
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NABARD for increasing the outreach. It has also instituted a
Micro Credit Innovations Department for planning, propagating, and facilitating the microfinance movement.
Given the network of institutional structures supporting
the microfinance movement, the SHG-bank linkage program
has been increasing its outreach substantially. Together the
commercial banks, cooperatives, and regional rural banks had
succeeded in linking 114,775 SHGs by March 2000. With an
average size of 20 members per group, the program had
reached over 2.2 million households. A large majority (85%)
of the SHGs linked to banks were essentially women’s groups.
The new microfinance approach has benefited women largely
and has emerged prominently as a women’s program in rural
India.

Review of SHG-Bank Linkage Program in India
Review of Models
In India, three types of SHG models have emerged:
1. Bank-SHG-Members: The bank itself acts as a self-help
group promoting institution (SHPI).
2. Bank-Facilitating Agency-SHG-Members: Facilitating
agencies like NGOs, government agencies, or other
community-based organizations form groups.
3. Bank-NGO-MFI-SHG-Members: NGOs act both as facilitators and microfinance intermediaries. First they promote
groups, nurture them, and train them, and then they
approach banks for bulk loans for lending to the SHGs.
Table 1. Models of SHG Linkages
SHGs
Model

Number
of linkages

1
2
3

13561
65636
15448

26

Bank Loans

Percentage
Amount
Percentage
of total (Rs in millions) of total
14
70
16

339.79
1339.95
250.10

18
69
13
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The second model, where SHGs were formed and nurtured
by the NGOs, was more popular among the bankers. Banks
opened saving accounts and then provided credit directly to
the SHGs, while NGOs acted as facilitators. This approach has
been widely accepted by the practitioners partly because of the
large scale participation of state government through development agencies like the District Rural Development Agency
(DRDA), District Women Development Agency (DWDA), and
some of the centrally sponsored social sector missions, and also
because of special initiatives of NABARD.
Sixteen percent of the SHGs were credit linked under the
third model where NGOs acted as facilitators as well as microfinance intermediaries. Under this model, NGOs formed SHG
federations and then facilitated them to assume the role of
MFIs. This model is expected to gain wider recognition with
smaller banks venturing into large scale financing of SHGs.
Under the first model SHG linkages were facilitated through
NABARD’s policy of converting regional rural banks (RRBs)
into self-help promoting institutions (SHPIs).

Review by Region (1997–98 to 1999–00)
The SHG-bank linkage program has been operating in India
since 1992–93 but has gained momentum only since 1997–98.
Figure 1. SHG Linkages by Region (1997–98 to 1999–00)
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Out of the total SHGs credit linked by banks up to March,
2000, 90% were linked only during last three years. The SHG
linkage program seems to have picked up since the Global
Microcredit Summit held in Washington D.C. in 1997.
Right from the inception, the program has been a major
success in South India. Its share in the SHG coverage had risen
from 60% to 68% from 1997–98 to 1999–00. The number of
SHGs credit linked in the central region had increased due to a
sharp rise in credit linkages in Uttar Pradesh. In the eastern
and the western regions, the number of SHG links had
increased, but these regions’ share of the total linkages had
decreased. In the north and the northeastern regions, the linkage program had not gained much acceptability.

Table 2. Distribution of SHG Credit Links by State
Population Population below
SHG
States
distribution
poverty line
linkages
Andhra Pradesh
Uttar Pradesh
Tamil Nadu
Karnataka
Kerala
Maharashta
Orissa
West Bengal
Gujarat
Madhya Pradesh
Rajasthan
Bihar
Rest of
States/UT

7.90
16.4
6.60
5.30
3.40
9.30
3.74
8.04
4.88
7.80
5.19
10.20

15.77
31.15
21.12
20.04
12.72
25.02
42.50
27.02
14.07
37.43
15.28
42.60

42.26
11.29
12.10
9.24
4.84
4.32
3.54
2.96
2.62
2.01
1.69
1.66

9.58

17.39

1.47

Notes: The figures are in percentiles. The rest of the states and union territories (UT) include Hamachal Pradesh, Haryana, Punjab, Jammu & Kashmir,
Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, Sikkim, Manipur, UT of Andaman and Nicobar
Islands, Goa, and UT of Pondichery.

28

Volume 5 Number 1

SHG-Bank Linkage Program in India

Analysis by State
During the past few years, India has tried several credit models
to alleviate poverty, some of which were formulated without
considering spatial dimensions. Land is a factor that is far more
complex with its sociocultural factors and typology that creates imbalances in the market and the socioeconomic growth
of the people. Of the aspects that affect the success of the program, very important are its suitability and adaptability among
practitioners as well as the poor living in that region.
The program since its initiation has shown severe spatial
preferences. It has been predominant in certain states, namely,
Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Karnataka.
These four states accounted for two-thirds of the SHG credit
linkages, with Andhra Pradesh alone accounting for 40%. Of
these four states, only Uttar Pradesh had a higher poverty ratio
(31.15%) than the national average of 26.1%. Some of the factors identified for the outstanding performance of Andhra
Pradesh in the SHG-bank linkage program were the following:
(a) Forty percent of the SHGs that were credit linked under
Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas
(DWCRA) were concentrated in Andhra Pradesh alone. (b)
2700 groups were promoted in that state under a special project
sponsored by United Nations Development Program called
South Asia Poverty Alleviation Program. (c) The credit movement in the south led to the evolution of community based
development finance institutions, which were composed of
SHGs promoted by NGOs or by district rural development
agencies. (d) District collectors, NABARD district development managers, and lead bank managers profoundly supported
the SHG-bank linkage program in the state. (e) Leading NGOs
in the microfinance sector in India, like Mysore Resettlement
and Development Agency (MYRADA), Society for Helping
Awaking Rural Poor through Education (SHARE) and
Bharatiya Samruddhi Investments Consulting Services Ltd.
(BASIX), were also working in Andhra Pradesh.
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Uttar Pradesh is one of the densely populated states with a
high incidence of poverty. Among all the states of India, the
Human Development Index is lowest in Uttar Pradesh. Credit
links here were facilitated by Uttar Pradesh Land Development
Corporation, which is implementing a World Bank–aided Land
Development Program with the component of organizing the
rural poor as SHGs. CASPOR Ltd. and the Grameen Project of
Oriental Bank of Commerce have also supported a number of
SHG credit links in Uttar Pradesh. The other two states,
Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, in south India were supported by
large sized NGOs like MYRADA and SHARE. As these
NGOs had greater creditability it enabled them to leverage
bank finance easily. Moreover, as the microfinance movement
had “originated” in South India, the awareness and acceptability of the program was relatively higher. Kerala, Maharashtra,
Orissa, West Bengal, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and
Bihar together had 23.6% of SHG linkages while the remaining
states and union territories had only 1.47%.
Rajasthan, Meghalaya, Orissa, Bihar, West Bengal, Madhya
Pradesh, and Gujarat have been identified by NABARD for
having higher potential of increasing SHG outreach. In general
the lower credit linkages in some of these states can be
explained by a lack of concentrated efforts by banks; the
inability of banks to identify NGOs with savings and credit
groups; a lack of motivation among bankers; a lack of large
sized NGOs with previous background working with SHGs;
and the unsuitability of the approach to the region.
One of the questions that arose after reviewing the spread
of SHGs in different states was, did the spread of SHG credit
linkages across India have a systematic approach? To investigate this, we have calculated the coefficient of correlation of
the number of SHGs credit linked with the population,
Human Development Index (HDI), incidence of poverty, and
spread of NGOs across Indian states. As the HDI was not available for the union territories of Andaman and Nicobar Islands
and Pondichery, they have not been included in correlations.
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Table 3. Correlation Results
Correlation
State Population
Incidence of poverty of
All states
States with poverty
below national average
States with poverty
above national average
Number of NGOs in the State*
State HDI**

Coefficient of Correlation
0.46
-0.01167
-0.505
-0.089
0.39
-0.06478

Notes: Poverty results exclude Andhra Pradesh because it was identified as
outlier.
* Number of NGOs involved in establishing SH linkages during 1999–2000.
** Source for HDI figures NCAER (1994).

The results indicated that at macro level, there seemed to be no
correlation between the spread of SHGs and the poverty and
HDI of Indian states. However, further analysis suggests that
states that were better off (had a lower incidence of poverty
than the national average of 26.1%) had a better spread of
SHGs. Besides one of the significant finding was that the SHGbank linkage program seems to be following the presence of
NGOs in various states rather than deprivation and poverty.

Analysis of Banks
The NABARD, Small Industrial Development Bank of India,
Housing Urban Development Corporation, and Rastriya
Mahila Kosh are some of the institutions that operate as the
wholesale financers of microfinance. As “bulk financiers,”
they leverage funds from the government, market, donors, and
lenders for lending to its partners and NGOs.
Reserve Bank of India and the government lend support to
the SHG-bank linkage program through policy formulation
and regulation while the NABARD acts as a facilitator and a
refinancing agency. The program at the grass root level is
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Table 4. Cumulative Distribution to SHGs by Type of
Bank
SHG-Bank linkages

Banks
Commercial
Banks
RRBs
Cooperative
Banks
Total

Percentage
Number
of total

Total loan
(Rs in
millions)

Average
loan per group
(Rs in millions)

51,619
38,998

55
41

1278.33
574.59

24,765
14,736

4,028
94,645

4
100

76.90
1929.82

19,091
20,390

Data as of 31 March 2000.

executed through a network of commercial banks, regional
rural bank (RRBs), district central cooperative banks (DCCBs),
and primary agricultural credit societies (PACS). The program
has been gradually gathering momentum. A review of the SHG
credit linkages by these institutions indicated that commercial
banks had established the maximum linkages. The RRBs had a
sizable coverage but the performance of cooperatives in the
program was minimal. The average loan per SHG also followed a similar pattern.
Commercial Banks: From the 1950s through 1970s,
the financial system in many developing countries was predominantly composed of state-owned banks and branches of
foreign owned commercial banks that provided short term
commercial and trade credit. The state-owned banks also promoted economic development priorities through a network of
financial institutions such as agricultural, development, and
export banks (World Bank, 1989; Gonzalez-Vega & Graham,
1995). The Indian banking system was also organized on a similar basis. The process of institutionalizing rural credit
by commercial banks 1 began with the nationalization of 14 private banks in 1969. Nationalization of banks led to “socialization” of Indian banks with interest rate regulations, branch
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expansion, and supply-driven, target-oriented programs under
priority sector lending.
The spread of banking had a dual effect. On one hand, it
provided a safe haven for savings and reduced the power of
moneylenders. But, on the other hand, directed credit had little
impact on growth and was a poor substitute for the physical
inputs that were needed for growth (Binswanger & Khandekar,
1995). Even programs like the Integrated Rural Development
Program were plagued by arrears and seemed to have only
limited impact on the borrowers (World Bank, 1988). The government’s treatment of banks’ funds as a substitute for public
spending along with their civil service attitude affected the
incentives to sound lending and weakened banks substantially.
Narsimham Committees I and II engraved the roadmap for
revival and growth of the financial sector, while the Gupta
Committee provided an impetus to rural credit through commercial banks.
Commercial banks have been found to be more suitable for
microfinance because they are regulated and fulfill the conditions of ownership, financial disclosure, and capital adequacy
and they have the necessary physical and financial infrastructure, including a large network of branches, and wellestablished internal control and accounting systems. A review
of the experiences of commercial banks successfully operating
with microfinance showed that Bank Rakhayat Indonesia and
Banco del Desarrallo in Chile, etc., had fully independent
microenterprise retail centers affiliated to the banks that
adopted appropriate lending methodologies. Initial cross subsidization was a normal phenomenon and was evident in banks
like the National Bank for Development Egypt, Centenary
Bank in Uganda, Family Finance Building Society in Kenya,
and some banks in South Africa and Peru. Micro and small
loan interest rates varied between 30% and 60% and were kept
substantially higher for covering the cost of microfinance.
Banks adopted different lending strategies; for example, Banco
Wiese in Peru worked directly through NGOs to disburse
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micro loans to groups, while some commercial banks in developing countries began initially with group lending but finally
concentrated on an individual loan methodology. Others like
BancoSol and Scotia Enterprise provided both individual and
group loans. In India, rural branches of commercial banks
undertake both regular banking operations as well microfinance. Regular bank employees who may not necessarily
belong to the area and are also transferable undertake provision of credit to SHGs.
A study of the participation of commercial banks in SHG
financing revealed that they were regularly involved in SHG
financing since 1996–97 up to 2000 and had established 51,619
SHG credit linkages. The State Bank of India (SBI) had the

Table 5. SHG-Bank Linkages of Commercial Banks in
India
Percentage
of population
Average
Average
below poverty SHG
loan by a
loan per
States
line
linkages SHG (Rs) household (Rs)
Himachal
Pradesh
Rajasthan
Jammu &
Kashmir
Sikkim
Manipur
Gujarat
Maharashtra
Goa
Andhra
Pradesh
Kerela
Tamil Nadu
Bihar

7.63
15.28

257
656

27,393
43,704

1,369
2,185

3.48
36.55
28.54
14.07
25.02
4.40

50
01
05
1,824
3,611
19

9,000
10,000
40,000
14,035
21,080
48,947

450
500
2,000
701
1,054
2,447

15.77
12.72
21.12
42.60

24,451
2,682
8,659
420

25,521
22,200
30,964
3,859

1,276
1,110
1,548
193

Data cummulative as of 2000
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maximum coverage, followed by Andhra Bank and the State
Bank of Hyderabad. Besides these banks, the Canara Bank,
Bank of Baroda, Indian Bank, Indian Overseas Bank, and the
Syndicate Bank also had significant credit links. Among the
private sector banks, Vysya Bank had the maximum credit
linkages; however the overall involvement of private sector
banks in the SHG-bank linkage program was marginal.
The commercial banks were predominant, with the highest
credit links in 12 states of India. Out of these, nine states had
lower poverty ratios than the national average. States like
Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Maharashtra had the maximum credit linkages, while in Goa, Sikkim, and Manipur,
where the SHG linkage program was relatively weak, commercial banks were found to be the sole financers.
The average loan per SHG (as well as for the household)
varied across different states. Average loan size was lowest in
Bihar, where 42% of the population lived in abject poverty. In
Jammu and Kashmir, Sikkim, and Gujarat average loan size
was lower than Rs 1000, while in Goa and Maharashtra it was
relatively higher at Rs. 2447 and Rs. 2185 respectively. Under
the program the loan amount is determined on the basis of savings. SHGs with higher magnitude of poverty have lower
propensity to save and hence the loans imparted to the SHGs
were also smaller. The small size of loans in states with higher
incidence of poverty indicates an inverse relationship between
poverty and loan size.
Regional Rural Banks: The regional rural banks 2 (RRBs)
were established in 1975 to support the rural lending operations of commercial banks. In their quest to increase their outreach through subsidized lending the RRBs were bestowed
with the title of “White Elephants” because of their severe nonperforming assets and viability problem. To date a number of
committees have been appointed (Agricultural Credit Review
Committee 1989, M. Narsimham 1991, Bhandari Committee
1994) to suggest ways and means to make these banks economically viable. Based on the recommendations of the Narsimham
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and Bhandari Committees, RRBs were provided greater autonomy for expansion and diversification of loan portfolio by
allowing nontarget and nonpriority sector lending, rural housing sector finance, widening of avenues of profitable investment, reallocation of loss making branches, and opening
extension counters and deregulation of interest rates. The
RRBs were also supported with a fresh infusion of capital from
NABARD and RBI. As a result, RRBs gradually started showing signs of improvement in their performance. The creditable
turnaround was possible due to a series of measures including
increased employee participation, systematic customer contact,
and the introduction of new products suited to the rural markets, like Farmers Credit Card and occupational loans.
The RRBs also responded well to NABARD’s initiative for
extending their outreach to SHGs. Forty one percent of the
SHG linkages were established through the participation of
84% of the RRBs. As one-third of the RRBs were operating in
southern India, the RRBs had maximum linkages here. Manjira

Table 6. SHG-Bank Linkages of Regional Rural Banks in
India
Percentage
of population
Average
Average
below poverty SHG
loan by a
loan per
States
line
linkages SHG (Rs) household (Rs)
Haryana
Assam
Meghalaya
Tripura
Orissa
Madhya
Pradesh
Uttar
Pradesh
Karnataka

8.74
36.09
33.87
34.44
37.15

99
46
117
3
2,405

48,182
11,521
22,991
26,667
9,650

2,409
516
1,149
2,333
482

37.43

1,417

13,529

676

31.15
20.00

8,755
4,120

5,875
24,277

293
1,213

Data cummulative as of 2000.
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Grameen Bank in Andhra Pradesh had maximum linkages with
2713 SHGs, followed by Pandyan Grameen Bank (2177) in
Tamil Nadu and North Malabar Grameen Bank in Kerala
(1266).
The RRBs were predominant in eight states of India. Out
of 38998 SHGs that were credit linked, almost half were in
Karnataka and Uttar Pradesh. In Uttar Pradesh most SHGs
were credit linked through the Kanpur Regional Rural Bank
while in Karnataka, the Cauvery Gramin Bank was predominant. Unlike in the case of commercial banks, the poverty
ratio was higher in the majority of the states where RRBs were
the major financers. The average loan per household was highest (Rs 2409) in Haryana and lowest (Rs 293) in Uttar Pradesh,
signifying that the poorest of the poor were imparted credit.
The average loan amount per household was below Rs. 1000 in
Orissa, Assam, and Madhya Pradesh, where poverty ratios
were relatively higher. In Orissa, the Kalahandi Anchalik
Gramin Bank had maximum linkages.
Regional rural banks acting as SHPIs were more successful
in expanding their outreach. As a part of an ongoing search for
sustainable institutional mechanism for widening the outreach
of financial services to the poor, an experiment was launched
in 1994 to test the feasibility of RRBs working as SHPI. After
an initial experiment with Cauvery Grameena Bank, 10 more
RRBs were encouraged to operate as SHPIs under the guidance
and monitoring of its sponsor bank, participating bank, and
the NABARD.
Cooperative Banks: The cooperative credit system 3 is an
umbrella network consisting of state cooperative banks (SCBs)
at the apex level, district central cooperative banks (DCCBs) at
the intermediate level, and primary agricultural societies
(PACS) at the grassroot level. Every fourth cooperative in
India is a primary credit society. PACS are grassroot level organizations that raise capital, collect deposits, grant loans, and
encourage various income augmenting activities such as horticulture, animal husbandry, bee keeping, and cottage industry.
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DCCBs, on the other hand, organize credit to PACS, carry out
banking business, and sanction, monitor, and control the
implementation of policies.
Cooperative banks have long grappled with operational
problems, as they are both state sponsored and patronized,
which negates democratic management. The basic principle of
cooperative banking, namely, reliance on resources mobilized
locally and lesser dependence on higher credit institutions, has
historically been absent from the Indian system (Kamarker,
1999). High arrears, interest rate ceilings, high priority sector
lending targets, and duality of control between the state governments on one hand and the Reserve Bank/NABARD on the
other have adversely affected the working of cooperative banks
and added to their dubious state.
In view of this, the central government constituted a special task force in April 1999 to study the functioning of rural
cooperative credit institutions. The task force made suggestions for: strengthening the resource base of cooperative banks;
reducing government control and making them member
driven; bringing bank related functions exclusively under
the purview of Banking Regulation Act of 1949; evolving
strong managerial and personnel systems; diversifying their
business products to consumer loans, consortium financing,

Table 7. SHG-Bank Linkages of Cooperative Banks in
India
Percentage
of population
Average
Average
below poverty SHG
loan by a
loan per
States
line
linkages SHG (Rs) household (Rs)
Punjab
West Bengal
Andaman &
Nicobar
Islands

6.16
27.02

20
1,761

52,500
7,938

2,625
396

20.99

23

28,696

1,434

Data cummulative as of 2000.
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and financing of the service sector; distributing insurance products; revising interest rates on loans; and setting up a cooperative rehabilitation and development fund at NABARD at the
national level and a mutual assistance fund at the state level.
The committee also emphasized the imposition of prudential
requirements and a regularized audit of cooperative institutions.
The coverage of cooperative banks in the SHG-bank linkage program was minimal. Only 26 PACS had joined the
program; the Hoogly DCCB in West Bengal had maximum
linkages (1,311), followed by Bidar in Karnataka (827) and
Krishna in Andhra Pradesh (827). Some of the reasons identified for the lower participation of cooperatives were slow
reforms, a lack of proper infrastructure, especially training
centers, and a lack of specialized staff to pursue microfinance.
Furthermore, laws in some states do not allow cooperatives to
lend to SHGs. A state-by-state analysis revealed that a majority
of the SHGs financed by the cooperatives were concentrated in
Punjab, West Bengal, and Andaman and Nicobar Islands
In West Bengal the average loan size was minimal (Rs. 396
per household/member), while in Punjab it was Rs. 2625.
Punjab is a relatively prosperous state with a lower incidence
of poverty. The credit linkages established by DCCBs were
more than those by PACS, since PACS by constitution so far
have not been allowed to lend to SHGs. The process of amendments to allow PACS to lend to SHGs has already begun the
pace of reforms, and together with other legal amendments
will have a substantial bearing on the participation of PACS in
the bank linkage program.

NGOs and SHG Credit Linkages: State-by-State
Non-governmental organizations were pioneer innovators of
the microfinance approach. With the inception of Grameen
Bank in Bangladesh, the notion that a real difference could be
made for the poor through microcredit and that the money
could be paid back as well gained wider acceptability among
the NGO community. Subtly, involuntarily, a shift began to
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occur and credit started to become something to be offered to
people rather than to enterprises. Emphasis on business enterprises began to slip as less and less sophisticated entities became
substitutes for viable enterprises. NGOs began lending for consumption purposes and, as further evidence gathered suggesting poor women’s creditworthiness in terms of their better
repayment capacities, NGOs also started lending to these
women. With time they underwent transformation and a variant typology of institutions emerged.
Tom Ditchler (1999) has classified these NGOs into five
categories: (1) single method replication networks, i.e., NGOs
which are linked to an international NGO family or international network that focuses on microfinance using particular
methodology (ACCION, Family of Grameen Replicates); (2)
multipurpose international NGOs which also have microfinance (CARE, Save the Children); (3) multipurpose national
NGOs which also have microfinance components but are not
part of any formal “family,” though they may have informal
linkages (CARD in Philippines, MYRADA and SEWA in
India); (4) microfinance dedicated national NGOs which came
into being solely as microfinance organizations, were spun off
from international NGOs, or were helped to become significant through international donor support (PRADAN in India,
K-REP in Kenya); (5) national, localized, and sometimes community-based (membership) NGOs, generally very small with
few if any linkages to other organizations—there are tens of
thousands of these registered and their number is growing.
Based on the success of new MFIs, India has ventured into
official collaboration between NGOs, financial institutions,
and the government of India. Collaboration between these
organizations has been an outcome of greater emphases on a
community approach to development through participatory
method. Moreover, the need to be cost effective and sustainable while reaching the poorest was also an important factor in
the collaboration of formal structures and NGOs.
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Ved Arya (1999) has outlined various forms of relationships between the NGOs and the government, namely,
schematic, dyadic, catalytic/confrontational, and institutional.
In a schematic relationship, the NGO and the government
assume the role of a benefactor and beneficiary; here the
NGOs are merely treated as little more than subcontractors.
Dyadic relations develop in order to execute a mutually agreed
project; here the NGO is in a relatively prominent position;
the government strikes a relationship with a single NGO
because of confidence in its capability. Catalytic roles and relationships exist where the government and NGOs work with
each other to enhance the benefits to the third stakeholder the
disadvantaged community; this relationship is open ended and
can witness certain flip-flop behavior. Institutional relationships are attempted where a program adopts a radically different approach, such as those emphasizing process rather than
targets; the SHG-bank linkage program falls into this category.
The present section makes an attempt to review the credit
linkages established by NGOs with banks for March
1999–2000. As against 550 NGOs during 1998–99, 718 NGOs
were involved in the SHG-bank linkage program in the year
1999–2000. The number of NGOs participating in the program
had increased by 30 percent over the previous year. The majority of the NGO linkages were concentrated in South India, and
the NGOs were mainly functioning as facilitators or as financial intermediaries. Table 8 presents information about NGOs
with major SHG credit links in Indian states.
The Women’s Voluntary Organization in Manipur, the
National Union of Cooperatives in India in Sikkim and in
Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and Boso Reach Out in
Meghalaya emerged as leading NGOs, with more than 80% of
the SHG credit links. Chinmaya Tapovan Trust, Professional
Assistance for Development Action (PRADAN), ACILNavasarjan Rural Development Foundation (ANARDE),
Maharashtra Arthik Vikas Mahamandal (MAVIM), District
Rural Development Agencies (DRDA), and District Women
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Table 8. NGOs with Maximum SHG Credit Links by
States
Name of
Percentage of
State
SHPI/NGO
SHG coverage
Haryana
Rajasthan
Assam
Manipur
Meghalaya
Sikkim
Bihar
Orissa
West Bengal
Andaman &
Nicobar Islands
Madhya Pradesh
Uttar Pradesh
Gujarat
Goa
Maharashtra
Andhra Pradesh
Karnataka
Kerala
Tamil Nadu

Chinmaya
Topovan Trust
DWDA
Deshbandhu Club
Women’s Voluntary
Organization
Bosco Reach Out
NUCI
PRADAN
PREM
SHIS

73.5

95.5
100
56.7
17.4
30

NUCI
Devas Dhar Jambua
Sarvodaya Ashram
ANARDE
NCUI
MAVIM
DRDAs
SKDRDP
CDS
LEAD

84.4
47.5
41
70.6
94.7
66
67
41.1
21.3
9.4

11.4
42.8
100

Development Agency (DWDA) predominated in Haryana,
Bihar, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, and Rajasthan
respectively, with more than 50% of credit linkages. The
League for Education and Development (LEAD) in Tamil
Nadu, the Community Development Society (CDS) in Kerala,
Sarvodaya Ashram in Uttar Pradesh, Dewas Dhar Jambhua in
Madhya Pradesh, the People’s Rural Education Movement
(PREM) in Orissa, and Deshbandhu and Southern Health
Improvement Samiti/Kashinagar Vivekanand Kendra (SHIS) in
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West Bengal were the other NGOs with maximum SHG credit
linkages.
The state government functionaries operating as SHPIs
were predominant in Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan. The
Swarnajayanti Grameen Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY) program
launched by the government of India has been routing credit to
SHGs through the DRDA/DWDAs with the active involvement of banks and NGOs. The scheme provides capital as
well as interest subsidies to the SHGs. Bosco Reach Out works
with the government for implementation of the SGRY in
Meghalaya and also imparts training for management and organization of SHGs in Meghalaya.
The NUCI was the main facilitator in Sikkim and
Andaman and Nicobar Islands while Peoples Rural Education
Movement (PREM) promoted, facilitated, and provided sustainable livelihood to the tribal population in Orissa. Another
NGO, ANARDE Foundation, started its activities in Gujarat
in 1979 with the adoption of five villages. Today it covers
8,675 villages and renders over US$ 110 million assistance.
LEAD, in Tamil Nadu, was formed in 1987 with the aim of
organizing women around issues of alcoholism, bonded labor,
and destitution. It gradually moved on to microfinance, and
today LEAD’s microfinance program has gained predominance
over its development programs. MAVIM in Maharashtra has
played a major role in promoting SHGs under the Maharashtra
Rural Credit Project of IFAD. By the end of March 2,000, the
project had promoted around 5,000 SHGs, reaching approximately 80,000 rural women (MRCP, India).
Sri Kshetra Dharmasthala Rural Development Project
(SKDRDP) in Karnataka was initiated to rejuvenate villages
and restore village life by strengthening its natural, social, and
economic roots. The NGO adopted a “Pragati Bandhu” concept which not only focused on SHGs but also on sharing
labor for developing the area through community work.
Southern Health Improvement Samiti (SHIS) in West Bengal
began working with health but later on diversified its activities
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to support the Women’s Empowerment Program. Under the
program women were organized into SHGs to increase their
credit accessibility and improve health. Community
Development Society (CDS, Allepy) in Kerala is a successful
model of women in development and has been replicated in 57
towns and one entire district in Kerala State. In 1993, 10,304
women from poor families with the support of UNICEF, the
federal government, and the state government had organized
themselves into a community development society. The NGO
supported a wide range of activities from income-generating
schemes for women, thrift, and shelter upgrading to housing,
childcare, and sanitation programs. CDS has gained recognition and legitimization from the government through official
approval of CDS bylaws.
With a view to facilitate entry of new NGO partners,
NABARD has developed the concept of “Resource NGOs.”
NGOs with long standing experience and adequate skill and
capacity in microfinance act as resource centers to provide
training and guidance to other NGOs to enable them to take
up SHG promotion; Chinmaya Tapovan Trust in Haryana is
one such NGO. PRADAN, established in 1983, is India’s leading NGO in microfinance: it works in Bihar, Karnataka,
Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar
Pradesh, and West Bengal. The NGO supports agricultural
activities like wasteland development, and improved upland
cultivation, and it also supports women’s groups for savings,
credit, and income generation.
The level of participation of the majority of NGOs in the
SHG-bank linkage program was limited. A large majority of
the NGOs participating in the program had less than 100
SHGs credit linked, while only a few had 250 SHGs.

Conclusions and Observations
Microfinance has emerged as a vital approach to meet the heterogeneous needs of the poor. In India, microfinance in the
formal sector has assumed the form of SHG-bank linkage
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program. Through this program, the Reserve Bank of India
and NABARD have tried to promote relationship banking,
i.e., “Improving the existing relationship between the poor and
the bankers with the social intermediation of the NGOs.” The
SHG-bank linkage program in India is rapidly expanding its
outreach under the pioneering initiative of NABARD, the
monitoring and supervision of RBI, and the promotional policies of the government of India. At the grassroot level the program is being implemented by the commercial banks,
cooperatives, and regional rural banks, with government agencies like DRDA/DWDA acting as facilitators. As of March
2000, 114,775 SHGs were credit linked, with the majority of
them being fostered in the years since the Global Micro Credit
Summit in Washington. With an average membership of
twenty members per SHG, the program has catered to 2.295
million poor households.
With coverage of two-thirds of SHG credit linkages, the
linkage program was predominant in the Andhra Pradesh,
Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and Uttar Pradesh states of India.
Further, among these four states the program was heavily concentrated in Andhra Pradesh, where 40% of credit linkages
were established. The acceptability of the program was relatively higher in southern India, because the savings and the
credit movement was launched here. Some of the other contributory factors were large coverage of DWACRA groups and
the operation of Swarna Jayanti Swarojgar Yojna Program and
the presence of leading MFIs. Kerala, Maharashtra, Orissa,
West Bengal, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Bihar
together had 23.6% SHG linkages, while the remaining states
and union territories had only 1.47% SHG credit linkages.
Northeastern India and Jammu and Kashmir need special attention and action plans because of the complexities prevalent in
the regional, political, economical, and human conditions. In
Haryana and Punjab the pro poor program had few takers. The
major reasons identified for the spatial coverage of the program in some states were a lack of concentrated efforts by
bankers; the absence of large sized NGOs operating as MFIs;
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few international development projects with focus on income
generation; and a lack of initiatives to dovetail existing
government programs with the bank linkage program.
Out of the three major lending rural institutions involved
in retailing, the commercial banks and RRBs were more forthcoming in lending to SHGs. Commercial banks were predominant in relatively better off states, where poverty incidences
were lower, while RRBs were more dominant in poorer states
and were more successful while acting as SHPIs. The global
experiences of commercial banks dealing with microfinance
suggest the need for the restructuring of branches, environment, attitudes, and their regulatory norms. The cooperatives
in India have yet not ventured into SHG financing in a fullfledged manner. Despite the large presence of PACS, the
majority of the linkages were forged by the DCCBs. Laws in
some states in India still do not allow PACS to lend to SHGs.
With legal reforms on the way, the cooperatives are expected
expand their outreach to SHGs. However, the pace of reforms
will have a substantial bearing on the involvement of cooperatives. The loan amount deployed to the SHG is dependent on
the savings mobilized by the groups. In states with a high incidence of poverty, the average loan amount was smaller, while
it was relatively higher in better off states. Initial loans to the
poor can merely act as a catalyst to instigate a process, but to
make a significant change, the MFIs would need to impart
repeat loans.
During the year 1999–2000, 718 NGOs participated in the
SHG-bank linkage program; the number of NGOs increased
by 30% over the previous year. Out of the NGOs and SHPIs
predominating in different states of India, the majority were
DRDAs/DWDAs acting as government agencies or SHGs supported by international organizations. NGOs with the back-up
support of external agencies were relatively more successful in
establishing credit linkages. In brief the SHG-bank linkage program has succeeded in reaching around 2.2 million poor households with major coverage of women. This has been an
outstanding achievement, albeit one with severe spatial imbalance.
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Notes
The exchange rate of rupees into dollar for the year 1997–98 was Rs. 37.165,
in year 1998–99 it was Rs. 42.333, and in 1999–2000 it was Rs. 43.333.
1. In September 2000, the number of commercial banks was 297, of which
196 were RRBs. The commercial banks had 32632 rural, 14431 semiurban, 10244
urban, and 8428 metropolitan offices. The per office population was 15000.
Commercial banks are governed by the Banking Regulation Act of 1949 and
interest rates up to Rs. 0.2 million were regulated by RBI.
2. As of March 2000 almost 54% of the advances were provided to the nonagricultural sector while agricultural advances constituted 46.3%. Out of 193
RRBs, 160 were recorded as profit making. The operating profits to total assets
had increased because of increase in interest income and the decline in the intermediation ratio. The share of NPAs had also declined to 27.9% from 32.8% at
the end of 1999.
3. At the end of March 2000, almost every village in India had a PACS. The
total number of PACS operating were 91,110 with an average membership of 995
and an average deposit of Rs 325007. The share of deposits to advances of PACS
was 26.9%. There were 361 DCCBs operating with a membership of Rs 1570 million with deposit to advances ratio of 62.2%.
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Microﬁnance for Housing
The Mexican Case
by Michael Goldberg
Marialisa Motta
Abstract: Can Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) help address the needs of millions of low-income families in Mexico for housing improvement loans? The
paper assesses whether MFIs are suited to providing housing improvement
credits and evaluates whether diversified housing portfolios can improve performance and mitigate risks for these institutions. After showing that the
microfinance industry is at a nascent stage in Mexico, and that the current supply of housing microfinance credits is a tiny fraction of the estimated demand
for these loans, the paper provides suggestions for government and donors to
serve as short-term catalysts for the expansion of MFIs in the housing field.
Recommendations include support for market studies to assess the characteristics of demand and to develop attractive housing microfinance products, providing incentives to help MFIs develop new or scale up existing housing
portfolios, offering innovative sources of funds for housing microfinance, and
encouraging franchising and joint ventures between various institutions
involved in this field.

I

n the last decade, microfinance has proven to be a growing
industry in many developing countries, with the leading
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) increasing their markets
and becoming financially sustainable organizations. Despite
clear indications of a large unserved demand for productive
loans, MFIs often lack competition from commercial banks
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and other financial institutions in the low-income market segment. As a consequence, MFIs have mainly grown “horizontally,” by offering the same products to new customers, rather
than deepening the microfinance market by providing a range
of diverse products. As the industry develops, many clients
have become dissatisfied with the inflexibility of existing MFI
products to meet their diverse needs, such as financing for
insurance, healthcare, house construction, or home improvement. The inadequacy of current products is the main reason
for relatively high levels of MFI client dropouts in various
countries, 1 representing a high cost to the MFIs, which could
be reduced through careful portfolio diversification (Wilson,
2001; Wright, 2001).
The objective of this paper is to illustrate the challenges
and potential benefits for MFIs interested in diversifying into
the housing microfinance field. The paper focuses on the
Mexican case, because the demand for housing improvement
loans is very large, government housing programs have often
proven inefficient and ineffective, and MFIs lag behind in
exploiting the opportunities of this new market. 2
For this discussion, housing microfinance loans are defined
as progressive loans provided to the economically active poor
to finance (1) minor improvements, such as carpentry, plastering and painting, and the installation of doors, windows, and
security bars; (2) major improvements, such as major repairs,
the replacement of walls, floors, roofs, and sanitary fixtures, or
retrofitting homes with hurricane-resistant technology; (3)
expansions, such as the addition of a bathroom, kitchen, or living space; and (4) the creation of formal work spaces, such as
sewing rooms or carpentry workshops, for home-based productive enterprises.
Michael Goldberg is a senior microﬁnance specialist with the World Bank’s Latin
America and Caribbean Region Private Sector Development Department. Email:
mgoldberg@worldbank.org
Marialisa Motta is a private sector development specialist with World Bank’s Latin
America and Caribbean Region’s Finance and Infrastructure Department. Email:
mmotta@worldbank.org
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While a considerable percentage of houses in Mexico need
improvement (an estimated 76%, most of which belong to middle and low income people, according to the Harvard Joint
Center (2000)) the poorly developed Mexican MFI sector has
conducted a small number of unlinked urban pilots in the field
of housing. The striking mismatch between demand and supply in this country is mainly due to (1) MFIs’ lack of information on demand (i.e., geographic areas where houses are most
in need of improvement and low income households’ willingness and ability to pay for housing loans); (2) MFIs’ inexperience in this field (i.e., lack of experience with housing
microfinance loans and a lack of technical assistance); and
(3) the unavailability of medium- to long-term, commercially
priced credit lines providing MFIs with reliable funding to
expand operations in the housing microfinance field.
This paper will show that (1) the demand for commercially
priced housing improvement is enormous in Mexico, (2) the
housing improvement loan is more like a microfinance product
than a traditional mortgage loan, (3) lessons can be drawn from
initial experiences in Latin America, and (4) there are a some
local pilots upon which to build. The paper concludes with
recommendations on how to support Mexican MFIs that want
to diversify their portfolios to include housing improvement
loans.

The Demand for Housing Improvement Loans in
Mexico
In Mexico, as in most developing countries, low income households usually prefer to improve and expand their current
homes rather than purchase new units. Low and moderate
income households often acquire lots in informal subdivisions
and then construct temporary dwellings to vouchsafe the properties (Ferguson & Heider, 2000). After the buyers of the land
have built small structures on the lots, they slowly improve
and expand the houses, possibly adding a separate kitchen, an
improved bathroom, or an extra bedroom. To finance
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improvements and expansions, they usually rely on their own
funds, borrow money from their acquaintances, 3 or try to get
loans from financial institutions. Often, funds are required
from more than one of these sources to reach the target
amount needed for a given stage of home improvement.
Recent studies show that the scale of demand for housing
improvement in Mexico is substantial (Herbert & Pickering,
1997; Harvard Joint Center, 2000). Contrary to general belief,
low income households are willing to spend a high percentage
of their incomes to improve and expand their houses (World
Bank & Capital Advisors, 1998). Based on a survey conducted
in 1990 by the Mexican Census, the Harvard Joint Center for
Housing Studies (2000) estimated that approximately 12.2 million of the total 16.1 million houses in Mexico (equivalent to
76% of the 1990 housing stock) needed improvements. 4
Between 1990 and 1994, about 800,000 improvement loans
were made, meeting only 7% of the estimated total market. Of
the 12.2 million units in need of improvements in 1990:
• 2.7 million units (22% of the housing stock in need of
improvement) needed replacement or significant upgrading.
A large majority of these homes lacked almost all basic services, were made from nondurable materials, and provided
limited living space for the families dwelling in them (one or
two rooms for an average family of 5 people).
• 3.5 million homes (29% of the housing stock in need of
improvement) needed moderate upgrades. These houses generally had floors made from durable materials and had access
to electricity and gas for cooking. However, most had deficiencies, such as walls made of nondurable materials, and
lacked a bathroom or a kitchen.
• 6 million housing units (49% of the housing stock in need of
improvement) required minor changes. These houses were
generally constructed from durable materials, had access to
electricity and sewerage, and had kitchens and bathrooms.
The most frequent problems were crowding, a lack of water
in the unit, or roofs made from less durable materials.
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While rural areas needed more housing replacement, urban
areas mainly needed moderate and minor upgrading: of the 2.7
million houses deemed to need replacement or significant
upgrading, 0.7 million were in urban areas, representing 5% of
all urban units. Of the 3.5 million houses in need of moderate
upgrading, 2 million were in urban areas, representing 24% of
all urban units. Finally, of the 6 million houses in need of
minor improvements, 4.5 million were in urban areas, representing 31% of all urban units. (See Figure 1.) While government institutions often provide loans and grants to low income
communities for house building, replacement, or significant
upgrading, they do not provide support for moderate and
minor upgrading. Thus, the potential for private institutions
interested in entering the housing improvement market in
Mexico is significant, especially in urban areas.

Figure 1. Estimates of Housing Replacement and
Upgrading Needs (1990)
Millions of units
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In 1997, the World Bank and Capital Advisors conducted a
study on the willingness and ability of low income households
to pay for housing improvement loans in three cities located at
the border with the United States (Ciudad Juarez, Tijuana, and
Matamoros). The study concluded that 14% of the low income
households in need of home improvements in these three cities
were willing to take out loans and could qualify for them. The
value of the untapped market for housing improvement loans
in these areas was about $122 million (98,000 low income
households with an average housing loan of about $1,250).
If we extend the findings of the studies by Harvard
University (2000) and by the World Bank and Capital Advisors
(1998) to the country as a whole, by assuming that 14% of the
9.5 million households in need of moderate or minor improvements are willing to take on and qualify for a loan, we can conclude that there is a market for housing improvement loans of
about $1.6 billion (1.3 million households ready to take out a
home improvement loan of $1,250).
While these are rough estimates, they demonstrate that
there is significant market potential for private institutions
interested in providing housing improvement loans in Mexico,
especially in large cities. More detailed market research is necessary to assess (1) which states and cities are the most promising, (2) low income households’ willingness to take on housing
loans in these cities and states, and (3) the percentage of these
households that would qualify for a loan.

Mortgage or Microfinance?
To verify whether MFIs are suited to providing housing
improvement credits, it is important to analyze the characteristics of these loans and to compare them with the characteristics of enterprise loans, which represent the core of MFIs’
portfolios.
If housing improvement loans are small ($1,500 to $2,000)
and have short-term ranges (1 to 2 years), MFIs may be the
ideal suppliers. On the other hand, if housing improvement
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loans are relatively large ($5,000 to $10,000) and long-term (5
to 10 years), mortgage institutions, such as commercial banks,
limited purpose mortgage banks, and credit unions, may be the
best providers. 5
Based on the experiences of a number of MFIs and other
organizations that have pioneered housing microfinance loans,
these credits appear to have the following characteristics
(Harvard Joint Center, 2000):
• Loan structure: amounts ranging from $250 to $5,000, maturities ranging from 3 months to 3 years, and interest rates
substantially higher than the prime rate
• Underwriting requirements: personal guarantees with one or
two cosigners (some loans also require periodic savings and
group liability)
• Collateral requirements: paralegal titles or simple proof of
ownership (e.g., the inhabitants of the village testifying that
the borrower lives in the house), although some institutions
require full legal title
• Technical assistance: for example, advice on construction,
building materials, and costs.
Table 1 summarizes and compares the characteristics of
housing microfinance, microenterprise loans and mortgage
loans. The main findings of this comparison are
• While mortgage finance loans are directed to middle and
upper income households, both microenterprise and housing
microfinance loans, are directed to moderate and low income
households
• The amounts and maturities of housing microfinance credits
are usually significantly lower than those of mortgage loans
and slightly higher than those of microenterprise loans
• The interest rates of housing microfinance loans are usually
closer to those of microbusiness loans than to those of mortgage loans
• Housing microfinance loans and microenterprise loans
require flexible, small collateral, while mortgage loans usually require full lien on property and legal ownership title
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Purchase of a new, commerically
developed single-family unit

$5,000 and above
15 to 30 years

Prime plus thin margin
Lien on property

From none to contract savings

Evaluation of individual household
income and credit worthiness and
of property title and value

None

Originator

Use of loan
funds

Amount
Term

Interest rate
Collateral

Savings
requirements
and
importance

Underwriting

Technical
assistance
to borrower

Source: Adapted from Ferguson & Heider (2000)

Middle and upper income housholds

Savings and loans, housing
cooperatives, banks

Borrowers

Mortgage finance

Table 1. Loan Comparison

Minimal

Building of relationship with individual
borrower or with solidarity group,
which commits to guarantee repayment of loans to its individual members

Savings is often as important as loans

Prime rate plus a large margin
Available goods, personal guarantees

$50-$1,000
Under 1 year

For microenterprise, but also for
emergency expenditures

Credit unions and NGOs
traditionally; regulated finanial
institutions increasingly; also
equipment suppliers

Low and moderate income households

Microenterprise finance

Technical assistance is often required

Evaluation of current income, borrower
household income, building plans,
and cost estimates

No standard

No standard
Para-legal liens on property

$250 to $5,000
Usually under 3 years

Home improvement; some new
construction

Credit unions and NGOs
traditionally; also building
suppliers and subdividers

Low and moderate income households

Housing microenterprise
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In light of their characteristics, especially their amounts,
interest rates, and collateral, housing microfinance loans
appear more similar to microenterprise loans than to mortgage
loans. In addition, traditional mortgage lenders find low
income households unattractive clients because they consider
them too risky and not sufficiently profitable. On the other
hand, MFIs are used to dealing with low income clients. They
have developed specific lending methodologies to reduce the
risk of low repayment rates; they have gathered information
on their customers’ credit histories and are able to select the
ones that are best suited to receive larger, longer term loans,
such as housing improvement credits, without endangering the
quality of their portfolios. For these reasons, MFIs seem to be
better positioned than mortgage institutions to satisfy the
needs of low income clients in the housing improvement field.

Lessons from International Experiences
Both in Latin America and in other regions around the world,
the performance of the leading MFIs have been increasingly
impressive in recent years in terms of the scale of operations,
profitability (after adjusting for the effects of subsidies),
and financial soundness. Latin American MFIs that have
achieved significant results include BancoSol, FIE, Caja de Los
Andes, and Crecer in Bolivia; Compartamos in Mexico;
Genesis Empresarial and the SIFFE Credit Unions in
Guatemala; Banco Ademi and ADOPEM in the Dominican
Republic; Financiera Calpia in El Salvador; and Caja Social in
Colombia. Many MFIs have proven themselves to be sound
financial institutions, capable of expanding into new markets
and developing new products for their target clientele (statistical proof of outreach, profitability, and soundness is found in
Microbanking Bulletin Tables, 2001).
By adding housing improvement loans to their product
lines, MFIs could (1) increase the scale of operations and profitability, (2) reduce client drop-out rates and the covariance
risk of the overall portfolio (housing loans tend to outperform
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other loans), (3) provide additional repayment incentives and
resources to proven clients, and (4) gain access to special
affordable government funds (both short- and long-term) that
are earmarked for housing purposes. These represent a very
powerful set of incentives to MFIs.
Two key questions arise as one considers the path from a
microfinance industry centered around one core product line
to an industry offering diversified services. First, what would
it take (in terms of incentives, market information, credit support, initial risk sharing mechanisms, and other support) for
the microfinance industry to move beyond limited product
lines of working capital and develop housing microfinance
products that could be attractive to millions of potential
clients? Second, how can sound MFIs build the institutional
capacity and systems required to develop a housing microfinance pilot and eventually full-scale operations, and what
role might the government and donors play in developing such
capacity?
To answer these questions for Mexican MFIs, it is useful to
turn to experienced, successful Latin American MFIs that have
already introduced housing microfinance and to understand
the path they took to develop this new field. Two Latin
American MFIs that have successfully added housing microfinance products to their existing portfolio are Financiera
Calpia (El Salvador) and Genesis Empresarial (Guatemala).
While the housing portfolios of these institutions are small
(Calpia had a portfolio of 1,450 loans in the year 2000, and
Genesis had only 330 active loans), their results to date have
been very encouraging (Ferguson & Heider, 2000; W. Kurup &
A de Rizz, personal communication, 2000). Both institutions
have found that housing microfinance loans have increased
their markets and improved client satisfaction, while lowering
their portfolio risk through diversification. Both plan to
expand their housing portfolios significantly in the coming
years.
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The key to successful diversification in both cases has been
a gradual process of (1) ensuring the soundness of the institution
with standard products before launching a new product (both
MFIs had reached financial sustainability before introducing
housing microfinance products), (2) conducting detailed market
analysis to quantify demand and identify key product characteristics, (3) introducing housing credit through carefully monitored pilot project, (4) providing technical assistance to clients,
and (5) scaling up housing microfinance products only after
client performance and cost management warrant it. The lending methodology does not appear to be a key issue for housing
microfinance, as both individual and group methodologies can
be successful, provided that the methodology matches the needs
and preferences of the selected target market (Ferguson &
Heider, 2000; Kururp & de Rizzo, 2001; Bonilla, 2000).

Microfinance in Mexico: A Nascent Industry
As in most large Latin American countries, the microfinance
industry in Mexico is still at a nascent stage. While the MFI
industry has grown impressively in smaller Latin American
countries (Bolivia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras), the
national industries have not developed in large Latin American
countries (Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela), where
huge pools of microbusiness clients have little or no access to
financial services. This may be due to the lack of credible MFIs
in large markets, or to the fact that barriers to entry for a dedicated microfinance banking institution are so high in these
large markets that such institutions prove impractical
(Christen, 2000).
In Mexico, there is one large and successful MFI
(Compartamos), some innovative smaller institutions (such as
FINCOMUN and CAME), and many small-scale MFIs with
socially motivated approaches. In rural areas, there are dozens
of village banks (Cajas Populares, the most well known being
Caja Popular Mexicana), which have historically been mediocre
performers and were, until recently, unsupervised and unregulated. Most Mexican commercial banks are not interested in
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microbusinesses and low income households as clients, because
of their lack of credit history, little physical collateral, irregular cash flow, and the high transaction costs involved in serving small clients. Table 2 presents a summary of the
performance of the key Mexican MFIs, together with Caja
Popular Mexicana. As shown in Table 2, the number of clients
served by MFIs and by Caja Popular is very low: about 560,000
for a total amount lent of $738 million in the year 2000. While
the table does not include all MFIs operating in Mexico, we can
assume that it provides a good approximation of the current
offer of microfinance credits. The demand for micro and small
business productive loans in Mexico was estimated to be about
$5.1 billion (Ashby, 2000). Thus, the current supply covers
only about 14% of the potential market. It is also important to
note that the supply is highly concentrated: CPM serves 84%
of the total active clients, Compartamos 11%, and all other
institutions less than 2%. These figures clearly indicate that the
Mexican microfinance industry is underdeveloped. The key
constraints to growth mentioned by existing Mexican MFIs
during a recent survey are (1) the lack of well-trained loan
officers, coupled with high staff turnover resulting in high
training costs, (2) the lack of adequate software systems;
(3) regulatory constraints; (4) high transaction costs for small
loan amounts, (5) the current decline of the Mexican economy;
and (6) the lack of sound judicial protection against client loan
default (Enterprising Solutions, 2002). MFIs and regulatory
authorities need to address these constraints to move towards
a more mature stage of development, cover a larger share of
the market, and venture into new products, such as housing
microfinance.
Besides being the most successful Mexican MFI in terms
of scale of operation and profitability, Compartamos is
trying to address these constraints in innovative ways, serving
as an interesting example for other local MFIs interested
in increasing their market and improving their performance.
Compartamos’s most recent plans and actions include
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Average loan size
disbursed ($US)
64,100
10,500
8,975
2,600
551
400
124
488,310

No. of active
clients
0.56
3.0
<1
33
4.1
18
0
14

PAR>30
days (%)
>100%
>100%
88%
N/A
N/A
>N/A
>100%
>100%

Operating
sustainability
>100%
>95%
N/A
N/A
N/A
<N/A
<100%
>100%

Financial
sustainability

Sources: Report for World Bank by consultant Lorna Grace (2000); interviews with Mexican MFIs.
* PAR is for microfinance portfolio only. This is the average first-time loan, rather than average loan.
** December, 2000 data for Compartamos.
*** Includes mainstream operations as well as microfinance operations
+ PAR 90 days
++CPM (Caja Popular Mexicana) figures include a large number of savers who do not have an outstanding loan. Data from 2000.
While the average loan size figure is not available, 40% of CPM’s active borrowers have annual income less that US$2,975. PAR is 90
days for CPM.

Compartamos**
240
Fincomun*
800
CAME
200
FOCOMI+
1,443
Emprendedores
880
Dignidad
500
UCME***
400
Caja Popular Mexican N/A

MFIs

Table 2. Leading Mexican Microfinance Institutions (2000)*
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portfolio diversification, an increase in the number of sources
of capital, a reduction of operating costs, and a strong focus on
internal training of its personnel.

Mexican Pilots in Housing Microfinance
While the microfinance industry is nascent in Mexico, and
microfinance for housing is even less developed, there are a few
Mexican institutions that are operating in this field, including
(1) FUNHAVI, a small-scale lender in the northern border
town of Ciudad Juarez; (2) the Caja Popular Mexicana (CPM);
and (3) FINCOMUN. (Private building contractors, material
suppliers, or land developers could represent additional channels of financing for home improvement loans but were outside the scope of this research.)
Among the interviewed institutions, FINCOMUN is the
only MFI. Caja Popular is a national savings and loan system
with over 300 branches (cajas), while FUNHAVI is an NGO
specializing in the housing field. All three institutions have
developed microfinance initiatives in response to Mexico’s
pressing need for housing microfinance, but they do not satisfy
even a small part of the existing demand for these loans. In
2001, FINCOMUN and FUNHAVI offered a total of about
1,500 housing microfinance credits, a tiny fraction of an estimated demand of more than 1 million loans for moderate and
minor improvements. Despite having a bigger housing portfolio, CPM has also been unable to meet the housing improvement needs of the country. Given that CPM has been
operating in the housing field for more than fifty years and has
had a specialized housing branch for ten years, the scale of its
housing loan portfolio is not impressive.
The three institutions face different constraints on increasing their offers in the housing field. FINCOMUN’s and
FUNHAVI’s key contraints, which are representative of the
constraints faced by most MFIs and small institutions, are (1)
limited access to affordable long-term sources of funds, (2) the
lack of a decentralized branch structure throughout the
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country or in states most in need of housing improvement,
(3) the lack of grants to support market research to design
attractive loan products for their potential clients, and (4) the
lack of information on best practices in this field from within
Mexico and other institutions throughout Latin America.
On the other hand, CPM’s key constraints to growing in
the housing field are (1) an excess of branches, some of which
are unprofitable and should be closed; (2) high portfolio risk,
which should be reduced to ensure that the institution is sound
before broadening its offer in new areas; and (3) the lack of
technical assistance to provide its clients with specific complementary services in the housing field.

FUNHAVI 9
FUNHAVI was established in 1996 to address the housing and
infrastructure needs of the tens of thousands of people moving
to Cuidad Juarez to seek work in the expanding maquiladora
(assembly) sector. As of 2001, FUNHAVI had 1,100 active
clients and an outstanding portfolio of $1.6 million. Its portfolio performance is very strong, with an on-time repayment
rate of 97%.
The Cooperative Housing Foundation Mexico (CHF) set
up FUNHAVI to ensure that private sector expansion benefited the city as a whole. CHF’s initiative—which began as a
pilot to support community banks and provide health services
to the maquiladoras—was funded with US$1 million in program assistance from the Ford Foundation, US$324,000 in
grants from leading maquiladoras (e.g., Cummins Engine
Foundation or Johnson & Johnson), and US$300,000 from the
Inter-America Foundation. As the need for housing microfinance became more pressing, CHF expanded its program to
include a full-scale housing microfinance program supporting
projects such as adding a bathroom or a kitchen, improving
water and electricity connections, and installing a new roof.
FUNHAVI’s housing loans range from US$510 to US$2,590,
with an average loan size of about US$1,550. The interest rate
is 2.5% a month, calculated on the original loan amount, and
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FUNHAVI adds a 2% upfront commission, for an effective
interest rate of 54% per year, in line with other microfinance
institutions in Mexico. The terms of the loans are between 6
and 36 months. A cosignature is required as guarantee.
The keys to FUNHAVI’s success have been (1) a simple,
streamlined, three-step review process that includes the necessary safeguards to minimize credit diversion and the misuse of
funds, (2) the integration of technical assistance, and (3) the
innovative use of partners, such as CHF and private local
companies.
The loan preparation process, from first contact to the
issuance of the loan, lasts no more than 15 days. Households
must be able to demonstrate a monthly income of two to eight
times the minimum wage (the equivalent of US$250 to
US$900). No savings or credit history is required, but the
client must be able to show recent pay stubs, provide the name
of a guarantor, and offer proof of land (which is a less stringent
requirement than formal land title). In addition, the community where the house is located must be stable; i.e., it cannot
consist solely of newly arrived maquiladoras. It also cannot be
close to a river, flood plain, or area subject to intensive
erosion.
Technical assistance consists, first, of a 30-minute educational presentation to ensure that potential clients understand
their rights and responsibilities under the program, as well as
basic information about suppliers and budgets. This session
provides key information on the characteristics of the loan
(e.g., amount and collateral required). The second step is a visit
by an architect, who reviews the construction plans and provides the budget for materials and labor. He or she charges a
fee of $22, the only charge in the loan preparation process.
More than 70% of the households that attend the presentation
invite the architect to visit their home and prepare an improvement plan and a budget for them. There are virtually no
dropouts after this stage.
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CHF Mexico has played a decisive role in the program. It
provides technical assistance and capital to FUNHAVI and
monitors its portfolio on an ongoing basis. CHF has also covered FUNHAVI’s operating deficit, which has decreased
sharply since the institution was founded.
The private sector has also played a decisive role in program expansion and streamlining. Cementos Chihuahua offers
FUNHAVI quantity discounts on cement purchases, and all
suppliers guarantee prices at the time of loan disbursement for
the life of the loan. The ESMART grocery store chain provides
access to 400 cash registers at its 19 area stores on a 24-hour
basis, so that FUNHAVI clients can make loan installment
payments. This shifts the burden of transactions and payment
security from FUNHAVI to the ESMART chain. The architects who provide budgets and plans are also small-scale
builders and work for FUNHAVI for a small honorarium.
FUNHAVI’s future plans are to expand to other border
cities, such as Tijuana, that also have a strong maquiladora sector and face a severe housing shortage, or to other attractive
markets, such as Mexico City and Chihuahua. FUNHAVI is
also planning to franchise its methodology to or partner with
sound Mexican microfinance institutions.

Caja Popular Mexicana 10
CPM is a traditional savings and loan system that covers 80
cities and surrounding rural areas in 18 states. It is a much
larger operation than FUNHAVI and has a more diversified
loan portfolio valued at US$288 million at the end of 2001
(Caja Popular Mexicana, 2002), with an estimated 30% (about
$86 million) dedicated to progressive housing. Through its
cajas, it has been providing loans for housing construction and
improvement for more than 50 years, but only in the past ten
years have these loans been treated as a distinct, progressive
housing product. CPM management is aware of an enormous
demand for progressive housing loans, as well as for new construction loans, in all the markets it serves, but the demand far
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outstrips CPM’s ability to deliver such services under current
regulations governing savings-based financial institutions.
CPM’s home improvement loans range from US$200 to
$15,500, and new home construction loans from US$5,200 to
$31,000. The loan amounts cannot exceed 40% of the borrower’s earnings. Regulations limit the loan maturity to five
years. Average loan maturity is 18 months, which indicates a
preference for home improvement loans, and interest rates
range from 1 to 2% per month.
To qualify for a loan, a household must be able to show
proof of an income level of three to seven times the minimum
wage and savings with CPM equal to 25% of the value of the
loan. A guarantor is required to cosign. CPM requires much
more time than FUNHAVI to review a loan application and
does not provide borrowers with technical assistance for contracting or construction.
Although CPM’s overall portfolio is weak by international
standards, with a portfolio at risk (PAR 30 days or less) of
about 17%, housing loans have outperformed the rest of the
portfolio, with a risk level of 8%.
To improve its portfolio performance, CPM has begun to
identify its weakest cajas and may close them, while establishing new ones in more receptive markets. Housing is likely to
remain an important part of its portfolio, given the high
demand and superior performance of this product line. CPM
has expressed its intention to expand the housing microfinance
program in Zacatecas, León, Morelos, Guadalajara, and Oaxaca
over the next few years. Changes in financial sector regulations
that provide a clear legal framework for savings-based financial
institutions could facilitate the implementation of CPM’s plan
by allowing them to borrow from government credit lines
intended to support housing construction and improvement.
Some key steps for CPM to grow successfully in this area
include closing underperforming branches, restructuring its
portfolio, and providing technical assistance to clients in the
housing field.
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FINCOMUN 11
FINCOMUN is a successful Mexican MFI with 17,200 clients
in low income Mexico City neighborhoods, an outstanding
loan portfolio of over US$3 million, and good portfolio quality (PAR 30 days at 4.3%). FINCOMUN is supervised by
Comision Bancaria Nacional y de Valores and is legally
permitted to mobilize savings from its members.
FINCOMUN has recently experimented with home
improvement loans, providing 500 loans to clients who have
repaid enterprise loans promptly. These clients were selected
on the basis of demonstrated cash flow generated by their
microbusinesses and, in most cases, because their business was
physically located in their house. Housing microfinance loans
are seen by FINCOMUN management as an extension of
enterprise loans and can be provided to clients who have outstanding enterprise loans from FINCOMUN. Housing loans
range from US$500 to US$1,000, with weekly installments and
an interest rate of 6% per month calculated on a declining balance basis. This makes the loan affordable—a typical family
pays about $80 per month for the loan. In addition, FINCOMUN estimates that 10% to 15% of the enterprise credit is
diverted, in part, to cover home improvements related to business operations.
FINCOMUN, the only Mexican MFI that has chosen to
enter the housing improvement field to date, seems well positioned to expand into this market—it is operationally and
financially sustainable, it is supervised and therefore less risky
than other MFIs, it provides larger loans than most Mexican
MFIs, and it has a clear commercial orientation underlying its
operations. However, scaling up its portfolio in this field represents a major challenge for FINCOMUN, because it does not
have a capillary branch structure and lacks market information
and expertise in the housing filed.
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Catalytic Role of Governments and Donors
This paper has shown that (1) there is enormous demand for
commercially priced microfinance and housing microfinance
loans in Mexico, (2) housing microfinance is more closely
related to microenterprise than to mortgage finance, (3) some
profitable products have been developed by Latin American
microfinance institutions that offer important lessons (albeit at
a relatively small scale), and (4) there are a few innovative
efforts in Mexico upon which to build.
The final challenge is to determine how the government,
with donor support, can serve as a short-term catalyst for
market expansion until a convincing financial argument can be
demonstrated to large-scale private sector investors and financial institutions, such as commercial banks. Well-designed
government and donor financial and technical assistance inputs
and incentives could help the Mexican MFIs to develop housing microfinance products. These interventions include the
following:
1. Supporting market studies and pilot initiatives
2. Providing incentives to help institutions involved in this
field to scale up their portfolios, or help to newcomers add
a housing microfinance loan to their product line
3. Providing innovative sources of funds for housing microfinance
4. Encouraging franchising, joint ventures, and exchanges
1. Supporting market studies and pilot initiatives.
Government and donors could provide short-term subsidies to
MFIs and other financial institutions to support market
research in large underserved markets (such as Mexico City and
the northern and southern states) and disseminate pilot results
widely. In addition, they could create a technical assistance
facility to support pilots, in order to help MFIs and other
financial institutions better understand the risks and dynamics
of microfinance housing, as well as possible complementarities
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between housing microfinance and existing microfinance loan
products.
2. Providing incentives. Large financial institutions that
have pilots in housing microfinance, such as Caja Popular
Mexicana (with its extensive branch network and hundreds of
thousands of clients), require technical assistance to help management assess this potential product line. Since CPM’s portfolio is not performing well, additional technical assistance in
delinquency management would be useful. Since CPM and
other large financial institutions have ready access to large
pools of savings, they do not require access to credit lines.
For small MFIs with an existing, effective product (such as
FUNHAVI and FINCOMUN), access to affordable lines of
credit is the main constraint to expansion. These MFIs can
only attract limited grants and investors, so they must turn to
other financial institutions as a source of funds. (See point
3 below for a discussion of this point.)
In addition, government and donors could consider providing incentives to home improvement chain stores to add
housing microfinance to their consumer credit lines. Home
Depot and other chains have a significant retail network on
which to build, both in Mexico and in other Latin American
countries. Housing improvement loans might prove to be a
natural progression for such home improvement chains.
3. Providing innovative sources of funds. Without reliable
and streamlined access to commercially priced funds, MFIs are
unable to expand into housing microfinance in a significant
way. Since the maturity of a housing loan is often two to three
years, the maturity of the source funds has to be longer than
those provided for working capital portfolios that are quickly
turned over, which are typical of the Mexican MFIs. Good
performance (measured by portfolio quality and administrative
efficiency) could be used to qualify MFIs for access to large,
commercially priced, performance-tracked credit lines for
housing microfinance. In Mexico and much of Latin America,
it is clear that the financial markets will not provide adequate
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funding to address this opportunity, at least until there is
stronger evidence of the commercial viability of MFIs and
their housing portfolios.
Other channels should be developed that are commercially
oriented and apolitical; these could be complemented by time
bound incentives for housing microfinance experimentation
and MFI institutional strengthening. FOVI has a program that
channels credit to limited purpose finance companies to provide credit for new housing unit construction. However, the
finance company (SOFOL) must identify a large construction
company, usually for a financing package of 500 units in various apartment buildings. Eligible clients receive subsidized
credit for 10 to 20 years and may also qualify for a grant for the
down payment.
The FOVI program is not the ideal form of financing for
millions of clients because it does not include the progressive
housing market. It could, however, be the basis of a similar
program for that specific market, or a specialized window
could be developed to promote progressive housing.
4. Encouraging franchising, joint ventures, and exchanges.
Innovative MFIs with significant housing microfinance portfolios (such as FUNHAVI) could be assisted in efforts to find
sound partners and expand to very large markets such as
Mexico City. Funding for dissemination activities, exchanges
(within Mexico and to successful programs elsewhere in Latin
America) could also have a high return in terms of rapid development of locally adapted products and delivery models. Joint
ventures between institutions with technical skills and specific
experience in the housing field, as well as sound institutions
with a decentralized organization, would facilitate scaling up
coverage of the housing improvement market in an efficient,
capillary, and fast way.
Applying the criteria mentioned above, which h
ave been used in the past to expand the coverage of working
capital microfinance in other settings, would go a long
way toward helping the private sector (MFIs, institutions
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specialized in housing, home improvement chains, and other
private organizations) to address the needs of the millions
of potential clients in Mexico awaiting access to housing
microfinance.

Notes
This paper was prepared as input for the World Bank study Mexico Low
Income Housing: Issues and Options. The study was financed and prepared
under the overall supervision of the World Bank Mexico Country Unit and the
Urban Cluster of the Finance and Infrastructure Department of the Latin
American Region. The authors would like to thank Olivier Lafourcade, Country
Director of the Mexico country unit; Mila Freire and Anna Wellenstein, coordinators of the study; and the people who provided information that made the
preparation of this paper possible: Adela de Rizzo and Wagner Kurup from
Genesis Empresarial, Eric Adams from FUNHAVI, Marco Avina Bueno from
Caja Popular Mexicana, and Vicente Fenoll from FINCOMUN. The views
included in the paper are those of the authors only and should not be attributed
to the World Bank, any other affiliate organizations, or the institutions interviewed in the course of the study. Nor do any of the conclusions represent
official policy of the World Bank, its executive directors, or the countries they
represent.
1. In East Africa, the rate of client dropout ranges between 25 and 60% per
annum. In Uganda, the norm is 25% or more. In Bangladesh, dropouts vary
between 10 and 15%. While the reasons for desertion are multidimensional, “dissatisfaction with the characteristics of the current products” is the main one
quoted consistently by interviewees across countries and institutions (Wright,
2001; Wilson, 2001).
2. This is due to two main causes. First, government programs do not allow
borrowers to take on follow-up loans, thus discouraging them from paying the
first loan back. Second, government loans’ very low interest rates lead the borrowers to regard these credits as endowments.
3. “Credit from friends and relatives mainly takes the form of unpaid labor,
assuming that the borrower will also be available to lend a hand in the house
building or house improvement efforts of the people who have helped him. Apart
from the provision of labor, it is also common for monetary support to be given
to a relative or a good friend who is improving or extending a house. Whether,
and to what extent, interest is charged on these loans, depends on the closeness of
the family ties in each case” (World Bank, 1997). For a more complete list of
households’ possible informal financial sources, see Ferguson (1999), p. 189.
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4. According to a recent study conducted by SEDESOL for the World Bank,
6.2 million Mexican houses (equal to 27.5 percent of the 2000 housing stock)
need improvements (World Bank, 2002). Inconsistencies among the figures of
different studies are mainly due to the differing definitions of “housing improvement” adopted by the various authors.
5. Multicredit Bank (Panama) and Mutual La Primera (Bolivia) are among the
few examples of Latin American banks that offer microfinance housing loans.
The Hatton National Bank is an interesting case: a Sri Lanka commercial bank
that has decided to “go downscale” and offer microfinance services (Gallardo,
Randhawa, & Sacay, 1997). For a complete list of commercial banks that are providing microfinance productive loans to micro and small businesses and that
could potentially enter the housing microfinance sector, see Wenner & Campos
(1998). Limited-purpose mortgage banks (SOFOLES in Latin America) are
another source of housing credit in the commercial banking sector. They usually
lend to developers during the building stage and then transfer the loans to homebuyers when the purchase takes place (Ferguson & Heider, 2000). Credit unions
may also offer housing improvement loans. They have legal and capital requirements that are more flexible than are those of banks, and they can accept
deposits and originate various types of loans. However, they have little experience in the housing field and, like commercial banks, are likely to have little
interest in adding this line of credit to their portfolio.
6. This is often used as a proxy for the client’s poverty level.
7. Historically, the Microbanking Bulletin has used a 90% ratio rather than a
100% ratio to take into account the fact that the adjustment process (i.e., the calculation of the FFS index) may not be exact. As the numbers of FSS MFIs continue to grow, the Bulletin has raised the bar on performance standards to 99.5%
which still leaves a small cushion for the adjustment judgment call (Churchill,
2001).
8. For more on Compartamos, see Bulletin case study on compartamos
(1999), pp. 13–17.
9. Sources for the information included in this section are E. Adams from
the Community Housing Foundation (CHF), personal communication; and
Community Housing Foundation (1997).
10. Source for the information included in this section is M. Avina Bueno,
Caja Popular Mexicana Vice Director of Planning and Organization, personal
communication.
11. Source for the information included in this section is V. Fenoll, FINCOMUN Executive Director, personal communication.
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Designing Microﬁnance from
an Exit-Strategy Perspective
by Larry Hendricks
Abstract: In bilateral microfinance projects, exit strategies or “hand over” phases
generally have not proven very successful. Institutions, groups, or processes
designed with the sole purpose of implementing microfinance projects, to the
exclusion of promoting postproject sustainability, tend to develop vulnerabilities that lead to their programs’ failure. To counter this problem, China’s
Chongqing Comprehensive Poverty Alleviation Project (CCPAP) takes a different tack, designing an exit-strategy approach into its microfinance program from
the outset. While still in the design phase, this approach has raised several critical issues that must be resolved, and these comprise the main focus of this paper.

Introduction

I

t is said that if you make a prenuptial agreement—an exit
strategy—before you get married, you expect the marriage
to fail. This may or may not be true in marriage. However,
in many microfinance programs, past failures to build proper
exit strategies into their designs from the onset have, arguably,
caused problems.
Unlike some Non-Government Organization (NGO) projects, bilateral donor projects tend to have relatively short lives
of four to five years. Therefore, the donors’ short-term involvement in the program and the short-term implementation of the
project create limiting conditions and serious constraints,
not faced by those who can take longer-term perspectives on
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institution building. In its short four-to-five-year time frame, a
bilateral donor project is expected to design a microfinance
institution or program, to build the necessary capacity, and,
when the project ends, to have established an operation that
has developed enough momentum to achieve financial sustainability on its own.
That this tight time frame may pose challenges has been
recognized elsewhere already. A recent U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) evaluation of a businessfocused NGO (2001) noted a need to bridge a development gap
between building sufficient capacity and acknowledging evidence of conditions that must exist for a program to meet the
needs of both development and secure investment standards.
This lesson was underlined recently in the Australian
Agency for International Development’s (AusAID) Qinghai
Community Development Project, implemented in China by
Australian managing contractor Hassall and Associates
International, where an end-of-project exit strategy was
addressed only after two years of development. But as the subsequent evaluation, in its “Lessons Learned” section, stated,
“the ultimate aim of a microfinance intervention is to ensure
that after the donor’s withdrawal the microfinance organization created will become autonomous and capable of achieving
financial self-sufficiency without further external assistance”
(2001, Section 2.3).
Although the Qinghai Community Development Project
had tried to establish a sound, long-term, sustainable microfinance model, its efforts were insufficient on several fronts. Its
internal monitoring and governance structure was not institutionalized adequately to carry on after the project ended.
Momentum built by the project during its life had created
neither the necessary infrastructure nor a sound enough governance base to carry it across the aforementioned gap, so that it
could operate at standards required to obtain a secure external
Larry Hendricks is microﬁnance specialist with CCPAP and senior consultant and
manager of Henricks & Associates. Email: henricks@sympatico.ca
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capital investment. As a result, a follow-on project had to be
designed to assist the program to become sustainable.
When a subsequent AusAID effort, the Chongqing
Comprehensive Poverty Alleviation Project (CCPAP), was
modelled upon Qinghai, the original project design document
likewise did not discuss implementing any exit strategy until
the project’s last year. At that time the designers foresaw the
need for a “hand over” phase. But in its proposal to AusAID,
the same managing contractor, remembering the Qinghai
experience, pointed out, “it will be important early in the project to develop an exit strategy.” This brief statement led the
microfinance team to consider an entire new approach to the
exit strategy in Chongqing.

Background
CCPAP is just getting underway under the auspices of
AusAID. It is an integrated poverty alleviation project with
components that include road and water system construction,
income diversification, and microfinance. The project targets
women in poor households, in poor villages, in poor townships in five national autonomous counties. All project components have a mandate for sustainability. For example, the
road and water system construction component includes a
mandate to train and prepare communities for the ongoing
operation and maintenance of those systems. Income diversification training will prepare clients to use microfinance loans
and to sustain new enterprises beyond the life of the project.
The microfinance program has a mandate to ensure that it,
itself, becomes sustainable and beyond that helps to sustain all
other project interventions.
The Australian managing contractor, in attempting to
implement the lessons learned in Qinghai and elsewhere in
China, is applying these lessons rigorously to the development
and operation of the CCPAP microfinance program in two
ways.
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First, the contractor is applying the lessons relating to
microfinance by documenting how the application is taking
place. Where the situation differs enough that a lesson cannot
be applied as intended, an explanation of the differences is also
being documented.
Second, and more pertinent here, is the exit strategy.
Instead of waiting until nearly the end of the project to begin
considering an exit strategy, the CCPAP microfinance program is, from the beginning, being designed and implemented
in the sure knowledge that the project ends in four years.
Unsurprisingly, this has already had a large impact on the program’s design, even though, at this writing, the microfinance
program is less than two months into development. Already,
the microfinance team has learned that it must address several
lessons from the emerging issues. The most important of these
are listed below.

The Issues to Address
A microfinance program cannot and should not count on a
donor continuing to support it after the end of the project.
That is, if a donor intended to continue support, it would have
designed the project differently from the outset.
Considering a microfinance program’s design from an endof-project perspective demonstrates the importance of filtering
all design decisions, putting every element of the program to
the following test: Will this program continue to exist without
project staff pushing it, and without project money to support it?
Will it be sustainable in its own right?
There are three major elements to every microfinance
program, and each must be tested against this filter. They are
(a) Management and Monitoring, (b) Management Information
Systems (MIS), and (c) Field Delivery Resources. Each is
addressed below in more detail.
Because CCPAP ends in four years, it is critical to assess
each aspect of the microfinance program in terms of its contribution to sustainability. The consequence of applying this
80
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assessment filter to the design of a microfinance operation
focuses more on other aspects of the program than on operational and financial sustainability. This filter adds several
dimensions to the project’s design, one of which is to develop
a local sense of ownership right from the outset, rather than
waiting until the project’s last year to consider the hand over
phase.
In an integrated poverty alleviation project, project team
members must make hard decisions about which aspects of
many project components contribute to microfinance sustainability. Participants must make a clear distinction between the
outcomes of community participation, training, and income
diversification activities, and the possible contributions of
these outcomes to a sustainable exit-strategy-oriented microfinance program. 1 This distinction becomes very important
when groups formed at the village level begin to discuss
income diversification. Should these groups also be given a role
in the microfinance program? The exit-strategy approach dictates that the answer must be “no,” unless the groups preexisted the project and could add value, for example, by adding
the screening of loan applications to such work as they carry
out already. Making decisions about such situations has the
potential to put project team members at odds, unless communication between them remains open and active and unless all
of them accept the need for sustainability in each of the three
major program elements. Following are some factors affecting
the decision process in Chongqing.

Management and Monitoring
In China, microfinance programs usually must work in partnership with organizations licensed by the People’s Bank
of China, a requirement that creates simultaneous opportunities and challenges. On one hand, in China as in most countries, few commercial banks are interested in working with
microfinance programs. On the other hand, if a microfinance
program can prove itself to a commercial bank, bank enthusiasm and support may assist the microfinance program’s
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marketing, reach, and sustainability. Also, if the bank recognizes the available marketing opportunity, it may use the
microfinance program as a lever, to position itself to gain an
edge in the increasingly competitive Chinese banking industry.
Sometimes a combination of these circumstances may occur.
Analysis of other microfinance programs indicates that in
most, the contractor or donor agency has controlled the management directly or formed a new board of management and
controlled it indirectly. When forming a new board, participant selection is usually based on the local applicants’ positions
relative to the project and so give more weight to officials in
local government and projects. Once selected, this board of
management theoretically is trained to manage the microfinance program. Unfortunately local participants often follow
the project contractor or donor’s lead, and so never really
learn to lead the program themselves.
From an exit-strategy perspective, this management
approach is not viable. It severely limits the ability of a microfinance program to sustain itself after the project to establish it
ends, in at least three ways. First, the contractor or donor disappears at the end of the project. Second, the financial support
is no longer available and in most cases the value that a
continuing successful microfinance program would have contributed does not exist or has not been cultivated enough.
Third, if the board of management does continue, it has
problems because it has gained no real experience leading the
program.
Applying the sustainability filter to CCPAP’s design
helped the microfinance team to determine that the project
could not create a new board of management for the program,
because its sustainability after the project ended could not be
guaranteed. CCPAP therefore decided that it had to build on
an existing local management structure and has made this
approach a mainstay of the program’s design.
Instead of creating an entirely new board of management to act as a governing body, CCPAP chose to ask each
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autonomous county government to nominate an existing local
group already interested in poverty alleviation and microfinance. This strategy anticipates that the county Poverty
Alleviation Leading Group will be nominated in each county.
This county leading group, led by a vice-governor, currently is
responsible for the local administration of China’s National
Poverty Alleviation Fund Program. There is a risk that not all
of these leading groups may comprise the best people.
However, more importantly, it is likely that the groups will
continue after the project ends, at least until the National
Poverty Alleviation Fund Program winds down.
Besides administering the type of “best practices,” capacitybuilding exercise normal in similar projects with microfinance
components, the contractor here recognizes that it must also
train leading group members to acknowledge and accept three
additional factors. The first of these is the benefit to the poor
of a sustainable design for the CCPAP microfinance program
rather than subsidized program. The second is that information yielded by high-quality microfinance performance data
benefits board members’ everyday work in local government.
The third is that a sustainable microfinance program
can reduce poverty and make each participating county
more competitive on national and international markets. Time
will determine whether the third objective is achievable.
However, CCPAP will make every effort to help translate
its microfinance performance data into a form that can contribute to local development, reduce poverty, and increase
local competitiveness.

Management Information Systems (MIS)
Many microfinance loan tracking and performance measurement software packages exist on the commercial market. Most
meet the standards of the Consultative Group for Assisting the
Poorest (CGAP) and are suitable for stand-alone microfinance
programs.
As stated earlier, most bilateral microfinance projects in
China must be implemented through a licensed organization.
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As also stated earlier, CCPAP has decided that it must graft
itself onto the existing structure of a licensed microfinance
provider. Thus extensive participatory consultation with
relevant stakeholders in each of the five counties where the
project will operate led CCPAP to decide upon Rural Credit
Cooperatives (RCCs), which are formal, licensed microfinance
providers, as recipients of AusAID funds for on-lending.
Where possible, CCPAP will use existing MIS and baseline
information collected by these RCCs, not adding any new
requirements unless a significant gap can be demonstrated in
the information necessary for the CCPAP program. Existing
performance reports will be used where possible. Any augmented reporting will be achieved by generating new reports
on current RCC systems. This process allows the project to
generate best-practice performance information and also to
audit its program. In this way the project will enhance existing
RCC systems, building on them to demonstrate how the same
information accumulated for their entire current operations
will both add value and contribute to more effective management overall.
With China entering the World Trade Organization
(WTO), the People’s Bank of China is implementing a significant series of financial reforms. Consistent with the
exit-strategy philosophy, CCPAP has determined that implementing Western accounting standards for its whole microfinance program would not be cost effective. Instead, except
for the addition of installment-based delinquency reporting,
Chinese accounting standards will be used. This will reduce
confusion and will allow the normal course of financial-reform
events to deal with other differences in accounting standards.
The exit-strategy perspective dictates that any other approach
would not be sustainable.
CCPAP’s project team believes that this approach should
reduce costs in its own microfinance operation while building
capacity in existing Chinese institutions. In any event,
this method clearly holds more opportunity for long-term
84
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sustainability than does instituting an MIS that would operate
in parallel with the RCCs’ current banking and MIS systems.
A stand-alone, specialized microfinance MIS could be easily
discarded after CCPAP ends, but integrating performance
reporting with existing local systems would make it less susceptible to abandonment.

Field Delivery Resources
RCCs have been recommended and accepted as the preferred
licensed institutions for the microfinance program, partly
because they have by far the most extensive township-level network of any Chinese financial institution. However, CCPAP’s
planners had envisioned that the All China Women’s
Federation (ACWF) would also play a significant role in the
project. Assuming a solidarity group delivery model, part of
that role would have involved the ACWF in the formation of
borrowers’ groups. Difficulties with this approach include the
ACWF’s small operating budget and consequently the very
low salaries it pays to its village-level representatives. In fairness, if they were recruited by CCPAP, the program should
also pay them for their services. Unfortunately, from an exitstrategy perspective, paying ACWF representatives to facilitate
forming borrowers’ groups is not sustainable, especially compared with the more efficient approach of using the RCC’s
extensive network. Because the project’s primary beneficiaries
are women, this situation has caused CCPAP staff much concern. However, the project design provides for training and
building capacity among ACWF representatives—the contractor team is exploring ways to help them become facilitators
and to sell their services locally as community development
consultants.
Skills with a repeat or referral market value that ACWF representatives could provide include the following: facilitating
development of village plans; developing business plans; forming loan groups; selling their services for preparing loan applications, as literate people who know the microfinance system’s
workings; mediating community and family conflicts; and
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providing access to market information. The project microfinance team believes that if ACWF representatives are credible in the villages they represent, then charging small fees for
their services outside their ACWF responsibilities will be
acceptable. Such additional fees would supplement meager
membership fees currently paid by households in these facilitators’ ACWF territories and so increase their incomes.
Helping ACWF village representatives become facilitators
would solve the project’s group facilitation problem in a sustainable way and provide them with opportunities to improve
their livelihoods as village facilitators, with potential to make
significant favourable impacts on their communities’ marketing competitiveness.
CCPAP recognizes that it has based this proposed solution
on three major assumptions. The first is that ACWF representatives would want to become facilitators. The second is that
villagers would be willing to pay them extra for their new services, rather than considering these offerings as part of their
ACWF jobs. The third is that the training CCPAP would provide them would be effective enough to raise their capacities
and make their new skills saleable. Even recognizing these
assumptions, however, the microfinance team thinks it best to
try this innovative method to achieve sustainability. Not to do
so would increase the project’s vulnerability to long-term failure, by increasing the likelihood that the basic foundations of
the program’s structure could not be financed after the project
was complete.

Lessons and Conclusions
The exit-strategy approach requires that the microfinance team
undertake both a serious evaluation of what already exists
onsite and an equally serious assessment of whether project
involvement can be built upon an existing structure or process,
to add evident value to that structure’s operation. These assessments must involve designing an effective capacity-building
program that strengthens any existing provider’s operation.
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Importantly, the exit-strategy approach also requires the team
to gain a sound knowledge of the other components of a multifaceted project such as CCPAP.
It is evident that single-purpose groups, such as boards of
management created solely to implement projects, actually
pose a threat to those projects’ sustainability. These created
groups are, in reality, weak points that make microfinance programs vulnerable to collapse after the projects that have established them draw to an end. To counter this threat, CCPAP
will establish a joint venture or strategic alliance between local
governments and RCCs to deliver small loans to poor farmers
interested in diversifying their incomes. The local governments
form the boards of management and the RCCs are the program
providers.
Most microfinance program designers think in terms of
creating new stand-alone institutions. The consequences of
adopting the exit-strategy approach are radically different.
Instead of establishing a microfinance institution, CCPAP
effectively uses microfinance principles to help the existing
RCC institution establish a new product line with associated
capacity, which it can market to current and future clients.
This is a significant shift from current thought on microfinance. Consequently, some microfinance specialists are having difficulty grasping and accepting it as a workable
alternative to the traditional microfinance institution.
However, CCPAP’s microfinance team feels that a properly rigorous evaluation of the situation leads straight to difficult decisions and to facing their consequences. Put another
way, the only way to avoid making the hard decisions necessary
to implement a good exit strategy is to avoid rigorous evaluation altogether. In the short term, avoiding these decisions
would perhaps help team members avoid confrontations—but
only to the long-term disadvantage of the program’s would-be
beneficiaries. Thus, with the exit-strategy approach, the team
cannot avoid hard decisions. However difficult, the Chongqing
Comprehensive Poverty Alleviation Project’s team is making
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the choices the approach demands. Time will prove whether its
decisions are correct and the approach is valid.

Notes
The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent those of
either Hassall & Associates International or AusAID.
1. In some ways this argument parallels the discussions among participants
in online microfinance discussion groups regarding the separation of microfinance operations from Business Development Service.
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The Impact of Large Capital
Infusion to Community
Development Credit Unions
by Jared Raynor
Abstract: Through a process of peer comparison and analysis of historical
financial trends, the impact of outside capital on the development and
growth of community development credit unions is examined and small
case studies of superior performers are presented. The data set includes
twenty credit unions that have received CDFI core awards in the 1996 to
1999 period. The findings indicate that awardees have a higher growth rate
than their peer groups in all areas of traditional indicators, including asset
growth, member growth, share and deposit growth, loan growth, nonmember deposit growth, and overall capitalization. It is further indicated
that while the award money itself has an impact on growth, it is not the primary cause of the higher growth rates over the peer group. Rather, the
award allows the organizations to expand by helping provide a stable
capitalization ratio, financing new projects that increase growth, and giving
the credit unions a positive reputation with investors other than the CDFI
Fund.

C

ommunity development credit unions have been recognized as a significant tool for empowering local
communities to develop and control their own
financial institutions. Every year the National Credit
Union Administration’s (NCUA’s) Office of Community
Development Credit Unions in the United States releases a

Journal of Microfinance

year-end report documenting trends in this special designation
of credit union, and several academic publications have
explored their successes (see, for example, Isbister, 1994;
Gunn & Gunn, 1991). The development credit unions have
consistently shown strong growth in assets, shares, loans, and
members.
Much of the research, however, has focused on either the
financial performance of low-income credit unions (LICUs)
compared to mainstream credit unions or on the impact of the
credit unions within local communities. Little has been done
to examine the impact on the development of the LICUs themselves from the infusion of outside capital in the form of
grants, loans, or nonmember deposits. This article attempts to
begin the analysis of how this type of capital affects credit
union performance by comparing a set of LICUs that received
large amounts of funding to a peer group that did not receive
the funding.
In 1996 the Treasury Department of the United States
began making investments in development organizations in the
form of grants, loans, and deposits through a new initiative
called the Community Development Financial Institutions
Fund (CDFI). Through a lengthy application process, development organizations throughout the country compete for funding in order to expand their finance-led development activities
in low-income areas. There are three funding classifications:
core awardees, intermediary awardees, and technical assistance
awardees. As part of their awards, core and intermediary recipients can receive several types of funding, while technical assistance awards are for reimbursement of technical assistance
expenditures.
This paper analyzes one type of award recipient, community development credit unions (CDCUs), in order to
understand what impact the fund money has on CDCUs. After
Jared Raynor has done microﬁnance work in Honduras with the organization HELP
HONDURAS. Email: jaredraynor@hotmail.com
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a brief description of the methodology, the institutional
performance of the award recipients will be analyzed and compared against a peer group. Analysis is performed using traditional indicators, including asset growth, lending growth,
delinquency analysis, membership growth, leverage (ability to
attract additional outside capital), and net worth and capitalization. Finally, the highest performing credit unions are
discussed in four mini–case studies.

Methodology
From 1996 to 1999, twenty-two CDCUs were recognized as
CDFI core award recipients (see Table 1 for a list of CDCUs
analyzed for this study). As of December 31, 2000, they had
been awarded $10,180,000 in capital grants, $1,450,000 in loans
(including secondary capital and nonmember deposits), and
$803,500 in technical assistance, for a total of $12,433,500. Of
the twenty-two awardees, two had not yet received money
from the fund and three had received awards in two different
years. 1
The impact of the awards has been significant. Those
receiving money (including the two 1999 recipients), collectively made 188,632 new loans totaling $255,661,904 since
receiving the award. They added 17,225 new members, creating
31,427 new shares totaling $18,924,292 in savings. They also
averaged $1,248,556 per CDCU in nonmember deposits. All of
this represents new money infused into and retained in lowincome communities.
CDCU performance was examined by looking at their
financial performance since receiving the award. Peer groups
have been used for comparative purposes based on the asset
size of the CDCU at the time of the award. The peer group was
established from the spring 2001 low-income designated
CDCU list and was further categorized based on total asset size
in the year the award was given. For example, a credit union
(CU) receiving an award in 1996 would be compared with
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Table 1. CDCUs Receiving CDFI Awards
Credit Union
Appalachian Development FCU
Vermont Development CU
Neighborhood Trust FCU
Bethex FCU
Northeast Community FCU
Unified Singers FCU
Tri-County CU
Quitman/Tri-County FCU
Homesteaders FCU
Near Eastside Community FCU
Alternatives FCU
Central Appalachian Peoples FCU
School Workers FCU
St. Luke CU
Santa Cruz Community CU
Faith Community United CU
New Community FCU
Union Settlement FCU
First American CU
College Heights CU

Year of Award
1998
1997
1998
1996
1998
1997
1997
1996
1999
1999
1997
1997
1996
1997
1996
1996
1998
1997
1996
1997

other low-income designated credit unions with a similar asset
size in 1996 (see Table 2 for asset size categories).
Individual CU data was obtained from the Peer-to-Peer
program, a program that compiles financial information for all
credit unions and is sold by Callahan’s. Trend analysis was
calculated for three, five, and ten year periods, where data was
available. Additionally, trends were calculated based on the
year of the CDFI Core Award in order to examine the impact
of the award verses general growth patterns. The trend was
based on five years before and including the year of the award
and another trend for the period of time from year-end the
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year the award was given to year-end 2000. For example, if a
CU obtained an award in the first year, 1996, the first trend
would consist of the years 1991–1996 and the second would be
for the years 1996–2000. The year of the award was included in
the “before” trend due to the lag in closing and actually receiving the funds.
Peer averages were also calculated by the Peer-to-Peer program. In order to control for the size of the credit unions, most
calculations were done using the growth percentages and not
the absolute numbers. Averages for peer group comparisons
were calculated by aggregating all the data points for credit
unions with data available and dividing by that number of
credit unions.

Analysis
An analysis of the data indicates that the infusion of capital into CDCUs not only provides additional funds for low
income communities, but it has a significant impact on the
growth potential of the institution.

Asset Growth
Assets for the twenty awardees grew at a very rapid pace, averaging 20.32% growth per year with a median of 16.40% since
receiving the award. The average growth rate before receiving
the award was 11.70% per year. The awardee growth rate outpaced the average peer growth rate by 12.85% per year since
receiving the award, versus only outpacing them by 5.77%
before the award.
Table 2. Asset Size Categories
$0–1 million
$1–5 million
$5–10 million
$10–20 million
$20–75 million
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Figure 1. Average Asset Growth
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Figure 1 shows the average growth for the awardees and
the corresponding peer group average, using 1991 as the base
year. The CDFI core award credit unions outpaced the other
credit unions by a considerable amount. The slope of the
regression line for the peer group is 0.086, while the slope for
the CUs is 0.342.
Based on the selection criteria for CDFI awardees, it is
expected that those chosen for the award would outperform
their peer groups. Indeed, looking at the 1992–1996 period, the
peer slope was 0.06 and the awardee slope was 0.18. While the
asset growth could be attributed to the selection process itself
having a bias toward outstanding performers, there is evidence
that the CDFI award has positive effects. If one looks at Figure
1 carefully, there is a noticeable change in the slope for the
awardees in 1997, where it becomes steeper. Between 1997 and
2000, the slope of the regression line jumps from 0.18 to 0.58,
a significant increase given that the peer slope increased only
slightly.
All but three of the credit unions outpaced their peer
groups, and only one credit union, College Heights, had negative growth (see Table 3). Appalachian Development and
94
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Neighborhood Trust are start-up credit unions, beginning
operations in 1996 and 1997, respectively. Consequently, the
comparison rates to a peer group are slightly misleading.
However, even if a comparison group of credit unions that
started up between 1996 and 1997 is compiled (17 credit unions
produce a peer average of 13.41% asset growth per year), both
CUs still outperform their peers. College Heights, the poorest
performer, can attribute most of its decline to the loss of its
one nonmember depositor, leaving it with zero nonmember

Table 3. Credit Union Average Asset Growth Rates

Appalachian Development FCU
Vermont Development CU
Neighborhood Trust FCU
Bethex FCU
Northeast Community FCU
Uniﬁed Singers FCU
Tri-County CU
Quitman/Tri-County FCU
Homesteaders FCU
Near Eastside Community FCU
Alternatives FCU
Central Appalachian Peoples FCU
School Workers FCU
St. Luke CU
Santa Cruz Community CU
Faith Community United CU
New Community FCU
Union Settlement FCU
First American CU
College Heights CU

Volume 5 Number 1

Growth
rate
before
award

Growth
rate
after
award

Peer
growth
rate
before

Peer
growth
rate
after

NA
27.9%
NA
14.5%
5.8%
5.2%
34.4%
13.5%
19.8%
9.5%
6.6%
16.0%
10.3%
7.2%
5.5%
8.2%
3.9%
7.0%
7.1%
8.3%

60.3%
39.7%
37.6%
32.6%
30.1%
27.5%
21.6%
18.8%
17.7%
17.2%
15.6%
15.5%
14.0%
13.7%
12.7%
12.0%
10.3%
6.7%
5.1%
-2.4%

3.1%
5.0%
5.3%
5.4%
5.3%
2.5%
6.2%
5.4%
5.9%
5.9%
7.3%
6.2%
6.2%
6.2%
8.4%
5.4%
6.3%
6.2%
8.4%
5.0%

10.0%
7.7%
6.2%
7.5%
6.2%
10.8%
7.9%
7.5%
5.5%
5.5%
7.4%
7.9%
8.1%
7.9%
7.3%
7.5%
5.7%
7.9%
7.3%
7.7%

95

Journal of Microfinance

deposits in 2000, down from $620,000 in 1999, though there
were other indicators of negative performance.
It appears that the CDFI award designation has a positive
effect on the asset growth of CDCUs. Though the award
accounts for a significant boost to assets in general, it does not
alone account for the high rate of growth. Other factors
include a focus or desire to increase assets at a rapid pace, an
increased ability to attract nonmember deposits, increasing the
amount of member shares through both increasing the average
dollar amount of shares per member and increasing the number
of members.

Lending Growth
The awardees were able to translate much of the acquired capital into loans, as evidenced by increasing loan growth (see
Figure 2). They increased the number of loans made by an
average of 3.39% per year more than their peer groups, and
total loans made (in dollars) grew 10.22% per year faster than
the peer groups. This was also an increase from the preaward
growth period, where the awardees were increasing the number of loans 2.65% faster and the amount of loans 4.91% faster
than their peers. Actual average loan growth for award recipients was 18.70% per year in dollars and 9.48% per year in number of loans. The loan growth in dollars was only slightly
Figure 2.Average
Average Loan
Loan Growth
Growth(in
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Dollars)
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slower than the 20.32% average asset growth over the same
period. 2
The two top performing credit unions were Northeast
Community and Near Eastside Community, both with average
annual loan growth over 42%. The other three top performers
were Vermont Development (39%), Appalachian Development
(36%), and Neighborhood Trust (33%).
The evidence indicates that the CDFI Award has a positive
impact on a credit union’s ability to expand its loan portfolio.
Major determinants of loan growth potential include a history
of expanding loans and a desire to expand the loan portfolio.
The growth in loan size most likely represents a trend toward
loans for larger development projects like home ownership,
small business, and possibly vehicle loans, rather than just
increasing the amount of personal consumer loans for the
CDCUs. It will be years before hard evidence will be able to
prove it, but it is anticipated that these types of loans will have
a larger, wealth-creating component in the low-income areas
where they are being provided, due to the equity inherent in
homes and businesses.

Delinquency Analysis
As a result of the loan growth, it was expected that delinquency would probably also grow—and it did. Unfortunately,
loan delinquency (dollar amount) grew at an annual rate of
15.99% faster than at their peer institutions and the number of
delinquent loans was growing 14.54% faster than in the peer
group. The CUs had an average annual delinquency growth
rate (in dollars) of 17.47%, after receiving the award, while the
peer group averaged negative 2.81% delinquency growth. Asset
growth over the same period (20.32% per year) outpaced the
delinquency rate. While having the asset growth outpace delinquency growth is desirable, the high delinquency growth rate
raises some concern.
While this section will focus on possible reasons for the
discrepancy between the peer group and the CUs, it is important to note that the actual delinquency rate is not that bad.
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The CUs had an average 4.36% delinquent loan/total loan ratio
(DL/TL) in 2000, slightly higher than their peers at 2.73% and
an improvement over the 1996 DL/TL CU average of 5.23%.
The median 2000 DL/TL ratio for the CUs was 3.63%, only
one percent point higher than the peer median of 2.57%. 3
The median delinquency growth rate (in dollars) was
8.82%, indicating that a few CUs had very high delinquency
growth. These CUs were identified as Homesteaders, Unified
Singers, and School Workers, all three of which had irregularities causing the delinquency. 4
If these three are removed in order to examine delinquency
growth rates, the actual delinquency growth per year (in dollars) changes from 17.47% to a negative 0.82%. This shows, at
least on the surface, that most awardees are able to manage
delinquency rates. A careful analysis of DL/TL ratio and
return on average assets (ROAA) provides a broader view of
the actual productivity of assets (it should be noted at the outset that the 1999 NCUA low-income credit union report gives
the average ROAA as 0.8% for LICUs and 0.9% for all federally insured credit unions) (NCUA, 2000). The DL/TL indicates how stable a loan portfolio is, while the ROAA shows
the overall productivity of the loan portfolio (though it can be
influenced by the loans to shares ratio and the amount of
income from nonoperating sources, like grants).
Half of the CUs followed a similar pattern of delinquency.
Assuming the money was received in the year after the award
was granted, one to two years later there is a jump in the
amount of delinquent loans.
This is usually followed by a sharp decline the following
year, as seen in Figure 3. It is assumed that the increase in loan
delinquencies (in actual dollars) results from an increase in
lending, and the sharp decline results from charging off those
loans. This may indicate some sort of pattern of poor loans
being made and then being charged off. The DL/TL ratio often
reflected this pattern. However, the ROAA was not highly
correlated with the DL/TL ratio. For most of the CUs, the
98
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Figure 3. Santa Cruz Loan Analysis

ROAA jumped slightly in the year after the award date, a
manifestation of the actual award money flowing through the
income statement.
There is no one pattern that characterizes the CDFI
awardees as per loan delinquency. Each CU must be looked at
individually, considering its objectives and historical performance. This would entail an entire paper by itself. However,
more than half the CUs in the study exhibit some characteristics of loan portfolio problems, though overall the DL/TL
ratio (4.36% average in 2000) is not terrible and the ROAA
(1.53% average in 2000) is better than even mainstream credit
unions. The portfolio problems are usually evidenced by an
increase in delinquencies two to three years after the award
date, with a corresponding drop the following year, due to
charge offs.
While some CUs had decreasing ROAA, many exhibited
increasing returns, indicating higher yield products. It is not
clear how much of the delinquency problem results from a
need for additional and better training regarding the new products. Delinquency rates within these CUs is an area where
future research is needed.
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Membership Growth
In addition to assets and loans, membership also grew at a very
rapid rate. The CUs outpaced their peer groups by an average
9.03% annual membership growth. This represents a significant climb from the preaward growth of 3.16% faster than the
peer group. The actual average membership growth for the
CUs since receiving the award was 12.66% per year. The overall large increase in membership may represent the recognition
given to the credit unions through their CDFI core award designation. For individual CU data, see Table 4.
As Figure 4 shows, the CDFI awardees attracted members
at a much faster rate than their peer groups. The sharp upward
bend in the member line in 1997 is evidence that the award had
a positive effect on membership growth. Having a sufficient
potential member group is also an important factor in allowing
a credit union to increase its membership. Additionally, a
focus on obtaining new members is important to actually gaining new members (i.e., the CDFI designation is not enough in
and of itself).
Leverage: Attracting Outside Captial
The credit unions in the data set were able to leverage their
CDFI awards by obtaining additional nonmember deposits.
The awardees were increasing their nonmember deposits at an
average annual rate of 21.35%, much faster than the 12.30%
growth rate of their peers. But even more important than the
growth rate is the absolute size of the nonmember deposits,
with the awardees averaging $1,248,556 per CDCU.
At the end of 2000, these credit unions collectively had
$29,096,898 in nonmember deposits, much more than their
peers, whose average composite was $4,290,633. 5 The CDFI
award requires that members match funds committed to them
from the fund 1:1. This can be done by using their retained
earnings as the 1:1 match. If the award is matched from
retained earnings, the credit unions must increase their shares
4:1 over a 24-month period. Given that only three credit
100

Volume 5 Number 1

The Impact of Large Capital Infusion

Table 4. Individual Credit Union Membership Growth
Year
of ﬁrst
award

Credit
Union
Appalachian Development
Vermont Development CU
Neighborhood Trust FCU
Bethex FCU
Northeast Community FCU
Uniﬁed Singers FCU
Tri-County CU
Quitman/Tri-County FCU
Homesteaders FCU
Near Eastside Community FCU
Alternatives FCU
Central Appalachian Peoples FCU
School Workers FCU
St.Luke CU
Santa Cruz Community CU
Faith Community United CU
New Community FCU
Union Settlement FCU
First American CU
College Heights CU

1998
1997
1998
1996
1998
1997
1997
1996
1999
1999
1997
1997
1996
1997
1996
1996
1998
1997
1996
1997

Member
ship in
2000

Member
ship year
of Award

1,257
6,994
3,257
7,750
1,100
673
3,650
1,996
871
2,592
5,839
1,334
1,880
2,316
7,497
3,778
4,428
4,030
18,946
2,442

627
2,920
1,491
1,786
832
560
3,410
1,067
821
2,468
7,004
1,368
1,906
1,624
6,227
2,797
4,218
4,550
15,454
2,234

Figure 4. Membership Growth Base Year 1991
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unions received nonmember deposits as part of their CDFI
award, totaling $1,450,000, 6 it appears the award group was
able to obtain a much higher amount of outside deposits than
their peers.
It is difficult to make direct comparisons regarding
nonmember deposits because they fluctuate erratically.
Consequently, looking at individual credit unions can be
misleading, as timing influences the way the results look. It can
be concluded from the absolute size difference and the average
growth data, however, that the CDFI awardees are able to
leverage their awards through outside nonmember deposits.
Even if the award money is removed, it represents such a small
percentage of the actual amount of the total that it has virtually no impact. This nonmember deposit growth corroborates
the CDFI’s FY1999 annual survey result that CDFI core
awardees are able to generate more outside resources (CDFI,
2001).
The combination of member growth and nonmember
deposit growth led to significant share and deposit growth, an
average of 17.91% per year. This was 10.68% per year faster
than the peer group. The growth in this area is only slightly
less than the growth in assets, indicating that much of the asset

Figure 5. Share and Deposit Growth Base Year 1991
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growth was coming from shares and deposits and not capital
from grants.
This type of growth demonstrates that the awardees were
in actuality growing faster than their peer groups independently
of the award money itself. If the growth were due only to the
$10.26 million in capital grants, the analysis would have only
proved the obvious—that giving an organization money leaves
them with more money. However, since asset growth can be
largely attributed to non-CDFI sources, it can be concluded
that the award created an atmosphere in which the credit
unions could grow at a rapid pace. Ultimately, this leads to
long-term self-sufficiency and continued growth.
As with asset growth, there is a jump in the slope of the
total shares and deposits line around 1997. Before 1996, the
awardees were growing with a slope of 0.20. After the award,
that doubled to 0.41, while the peer group had a slope of 0.05
before and 0.11 after 1996. This shows a strong relationship
between growth and the CDFI award.

Net Worth and Capitalization
The net worth of the CUs was increasing by an average 28.98%
per year after receiving the award. It is intuitive that the net
worth would be increasing, given that the awards consisted
mainly of capital grants. As with assets, however, the type of
net worth growth is indicative of more than just the award
money. It has already been discussed that much of the money
was transformed quickly into revenue-generating loans, which
would increase net worth. Additionally, the awardees were
able to leverage their awards to get grant money and secondary
capital from other sources, similar to the nonmember deposits
scenario. Due to a lack of available information, it was not possible to analyze what the net worth growth would look like
without the award money. 7
While the capital ratio analysis is constrained by the analysis of net worth, the absolute (versus the comparative) numbers
are important to consider. As seen in Figure 6, the capital ratio
has risen from 6% in 1992 to 14% in 2000. It appears that the
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CDFI award money helped fuel the growth from the 9% range
to the current levels.
By NCUA standards, 7% and above is considered well capitalized. In their year-end 2000 report, they state that lowincome designated credit unions had an average net worth ratio
of 11.3%, with all credit unions slightly less than that (NCUA,
2001). Given the growth rates of these credit unions, it seems
the CDFI money has been critical to keeping them financially
sound. Had they not received the equity grants, not
only would their growth likely have been reduced, but
they probably would have experienced other problems, including regulator and risk problems. Additionally, having a
strengthened capital position enables the CUs to launch new
loan products, increase loan size, take greater risk in lending to
very low income people, and expand operations without fear
of NCUA intervention.

Case Analysis of Best Performances
Given the performance of the credit unions in the data set, it
was desirable to begin analyzing what characteristics contributed to their growth. To do so, a simple rating system was
set up to find the top performers from the awardees. The credit
unions were ranked according to growth over the peer group
in the growth categories discussed in this report. The top five

Figure 6. Average Capital Ratio
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performers were given points, starting with five points for the
top performer and one point for the fifth. All others received
zero points for that category. The totals were then simply
aggregated (see Table 5 for the ratings breakdown).
The top four performers, in order of highest to lowest,
were: Vermont Development, Northeast Community,
Neighborhood Trust, and Appalachian Development. A simple
set of questions based on specific CDFI goals and financial
statements was compiled for each CU. Additionally, due to
availability and geographic diversity, Bethex and Quitman/
Tri-County were also included in the case study. 8 Northeast
Community and Neighborhood Trust did not respond to the
questions and so are not included.
The surveys were very preliminary and not comprehensive. The results, which will be briefly described below, were
intended to provide an overview to this research as well as provide a basis for future research. As a further disclaimer, ranking in the top portion of this research is not necessarily an
indicator of CU success, though the top performers (or the
CDCU) have all shown remarkable growth and innovation.

Vermont Development Federal Credit Union
Vermont, though not the number one performer in any one
category, consistently outperformed in all areas of growth.
According to sources at the credit union, a recent project by
the University of Vermont found that VDFCU helps people in
three areas: (1) a direct financial impact; (2) giving people a
long-term picture of their own financial life (i.e., plans to get a
better job, etc.); and (3) confidence, voting, and involvement in
the community.
As already mentioned, VDFCU had significant asset
growth. Since the CU receives no support from the state of
Vermont, most of its funding has come from social investors
and federal funds. In recent years, many of the social investors
have made deposits as members (versus nonmember deposits).
The CU continues to increase membership from its lowincome target market, but these shares represent a very small
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amount of the total. VDFCU attributes much of its member
and loan growth to successful partnerships with other organizations. On the other hand, its loans are made almost exclusively to low-income individuals. Through an innovative loan
program, with the slogan “we don’t say no, we say when,” it
prepares individuals to receive loans rather than just denying
them outright. This “tracker” loan is educational and also helps
perspective borrowers “overcome a psychological milestone.”
Consequently, the CU is quite successful in lending out its
assets, with total loans to total assets at 88% in 2000.
VDFCU has also hired a “pipeline counselor” who helps
people who aren’t ready, but want to own a home. VDFCU
has been successful in increasing the amount of loans while
simultaneously decreasing delinquencies and attributes this to
having high credit standards and preparing its borrowers. The
CU is very proactive about helping borrowers not to take
more than they can afford (for example, encouraging a cheaper
car). VDFCU also services all of its own loans, which, in the
words of the management, “allows us to hear or see when there
is a problem and we can react quickly.”
VDFCU’s major obstacle to growth is acquiring sufficient
capital to increase lending. For example, management cites the
$100,000 insurance cap on deposits as a deterrent to many
would-be depositors who already support and believe in the
credit union. Consequently, VDFCU doesn’t think that it can
keep up the growth of nonmember deposits (one of the two
areas where it was not in the top five for growth).
The capital ratio, 19% in 2000, is an important aspect of
their growth. It causes less hassle from the regulators as it
expands and tries new programs. VDFCU has also been
remarkably self-sufficient in the last couple of years (as evidenced by earned revenue to expenses), which is attributable to
its size. As it grew it needed grant money to help with all of its
new programs and expansions. Now, while grants are still
important to the organization, it is able to self-fund or
partially self-fund some of its new projects.
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VDFCU has also been successful at retaining employees
and attracting new, high-quality employees. While management says some of that is due to layoffs in the banking world,
they also note the size and success of the CU as major draws
for good employees. The CU also has significant training for
its tellers, whom it uses as a tool to promote savings, and new
products (like CDs) and to keep good relations with its
customers.

Appalachian Development Federal Credit Union
Appalachian Development started operations in 1996. It grew
quickly, even when compared to the start-up group of the same
period. As part of an initiative to attract outside resources, it
has a nonmember investment program that is very successful at
attracting deposits. Additionally, management notes that since
becoming a CDFI core awardee, financial institutions call them
wanting to invest in the credit union. Unfortunately, it has not
been able to capitalize on all of the offers due to NCUA nonmember deposit constraints and a concern for its capitalization
(the nonmember deposits would increase assets but not net
worth, causing a lower capital ratio).
Appalachian’s membership growth is attributable to constant outreach and “very powerful” word of mouth in the area.
It has also had success increasing its loans, which is remarkable
given that many of its members need loans between $70 and
$500. As part of the solution to its delinquency problem, it
recently had the fortune of adding an attorney to its board,
who is volunteering her services.
As a start-up, Appalachian Development is interested in its
long-term sustainability. Its plans to increase self-sufficiency
include increasing its membership (economies of scale)
and building solid, long-lasting relationships. One of the
most innovative things Appalachian Development does to
solidify relationships and build community is to host periodic
events for the members. In the summer of 2001, it had four
family swim nights. These events single it out as a thoughtful
asset to the community. Another innovative program is the
108
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Drive-to-Work program. Given the rural community the CU
serves, cars are an important aspect of job security and growth.
This program gives members the chance to improve their
quality of life by providing reliable transportation.

Bethex Federal Credit Union
Bethex has been able to leverage its CDFI money with remarkable success. Much of its success has come from expanding its
membership, which it does through outreach programs and
acquisitions of other credit unions. It has taken control of several credit unions in the last couple of years that were in financial trouble and attributes its ability to do this to its high
capital ratio (17.70% in 2000), which is largely attributable to
the CDFI grant. As a consequence, the CU has doubled in size
in the last five years. One of the techniques for outreach
includes a school banking program. It is very resource intense,
but Bethex goes into the schools and helps young people start
and maintain accounts. It pays off through the new members
it brings into the CU, including parents of the children. In
management’s words, “it makes saving a family affair.”
Perhaps the most innovative program in the country is the
recent partnership that Bethex has formed with local check
cashers, long considered the enemy to low-income individuals
and CDCUs. Bethex hopes to use the check cashers to offer
more convenient services to its members and break down the
antagonistic relationship between the two. Additionally, while
many CDFIs cite lending to microenterprise as a way to create
jobs in the community, Bethex goes a step further, employing
welfare-to-work individuals directly in the credit union. One
of the welfare-to-work recipients is the new manager for one of
Bethex’s newly opened branches.
On the lending side, Bethex notes a lack of demand as a
reason why it is only 45% loaned out. However, it has been
able to increase its loan growth by “refinancing,” for example,
a $1,000 loan for $5,000 and by expanding its microenterprise
loans. According to management, while only 10% of the microenterprises succeed, even when the failures can usually be
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counted successes because people gain confidence and skills by
running their own business. Bethex management has learned
that “we have to know their business and what they need better than they do,” in order to be successful with business loans.
Overall, there is an air of “can-do” at Bethex. Employees and
management think innovative and big, and when an idea
works, they are pleased; when it doesn’t, they consider it time
to try the next new idea.

Quitman/Tri-County Federal Credit Union
Quitman has a historical reputation of success for rural credit
unions. Its growth is best characterized by two recently
opened branches and plans for a third. It intended to use the
CDFI money to expand its lending for home improvement and
residential construction. According to management, just
recently it built the first new housing unit in Quitman
County, Mississippi, in the last fifteen years. One of
Quitman’s keys to success is its close relationship with a local
community development nonprofit organization. The two
organizations have a symbiotic relationship that allows for
both organizations to maximize the good to the community.
Quitman has worked hard to be a self-sufficient organization
and has self-sufficiency as a constant goal. Management says
there is “a bias towards action”—the board and staff are very
good about quickly evaluating and implementing new
programs. This has allowed Quitman to capitalize on many
opportunities that would have been lost at other credit unions.

Key Findings
There were several themes that emerged from the successful
credit unions. Though not exhaustive, these characteristics
seem to be important to the growth trends of these institutions.
1. Growth orientation. All of the organizations have
explicit aggressive growth goals. They do not get bogged down
in a plethora of specific goals, though they do plan for their
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growth. Part of the growth orientation is a desire to be a selfsufficient organization.
2. Partnerships. The credit unions have established and
carefully manage partnerships with other agencies in the community. Some of them work directly with nonprofit organizations. As a sidenote, they also indicate that when a partnership
goes wrong, it kills a project.
3. Innovative. These credit unions have an orientation for
trying new things. They are not afraid of charting new territory and their entire staffs are encouraged to be a part of the
innovation.
4. Strong networks. Their networks consist of more than
just partnerships—there are many specific personal relationships between personnel at the credit unions and people at
other organizations or in the community. The credit unions
know their NCUA regulators very well and what the regulators want.
5. Good employees. The management and staff at the credit
unions are energetic and innovative. The credit unions pay
more for their staff (at least anecdotally) in order to attract and
keep them. They put time and resources into training and
promoting from within.
6. Importance of the CDFI award. The equity money, especially, appears to be critical to all the high growth organizations in order to maintain an adequate capital ratio. They also
indicate that the designation has had positive marketing effects
for the organization. While the marketing effects are unique to
CDFI, the necessity of the equity money could be applied to
any large grant making organization (and some would argue so
could the marketing effects).
7. Problems with member savings. Almost as an aside, it is
important to note that the largest problem area mentioned is
getting their members to save larger amounts of money. This is
an area that merits further research.
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Conclusion
What impact does a CDFI core award designation or the infusion of outside equity have on a credit union? The evidence
provided here indicates that it allows the credit union to grow
at a rate significantly faster than it normally would. The CDFI
designation does two important things. First, it is essentially a
stamp of confidence and advertising that allows the CU to
solicit and obtain additional resources, specifically through
nonmember deposits and member growth. Second, it provides
a shot of capital that allows the CU to pursue projects that it
otherwise would not be able to do.
Many CUs are constrained by capital limitations. Many
development credit unions have expanded to their capacity of
financial resources, though not of ideas, needs, or clients. The
CDFI award provides a significant resource to overcome a hurdle blocking growth, which will allow them to more fully
serve their communities.
Additional research needs to examine whether the infusion
of capital has the same impact on other types of microcredit
institutions. Research also needs to examine the organizational
implications of rapid growth due to capital grants and what
quality and service implications exist due to the growth.
The analysis presented here indicates that the infusion of
outside capital has a positive snowball effect on CDCUs.
Credit Unions get capital, leverage that capital through outside
resources, expand their products and services, and generate
more income. Their constituency gains wealth both through
loans to increase their asset base (in the form of a car, a small
business, etc.) and through returns on their deposits, not to
mention the avoidance of costly fees and services through
unfriendly low-income lenders like pawnshops and predatory
lenders. As they gain wealth, the resources of the credit unions
increase and their income generating potential goes up. Over
the long-term, this means self-sufficiency, growth, and hope
for low-income communities.
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Notes
This project was made possible thanks to the JP Morgan/Chase Summer
Internship Program. Special thanks to the National Federation of Community
Development Credit Unions (NFCDCU) and its staff for technical assistance and
support with this project: Clifford Rosenthal, Executive Director, and Cathie
Mahon, Consultant. Additional thanks to Antonia Bullard, Lisa Carter, Joy
Cousminer, Nikita Presley-Brown, and Robert Jackson for their responses to
interviews/questionnaires for the case studies of top performers.
1. Chowan CU, Inc., and Borinquen FCU had not received money and are
not included in the analysis. Multiple-award recipients are: Alternatives FCU in
1997 and 1999, Bethex FCU in 1996 and 1998, and School Workers FCU in 1996
and 1999.
2. The asset to loan growth spread of the after award period (1.62%) was
inverted from the before period. Loans were growing faster than assets by 2.25%
in the before period. The transposition is easily accounted for by the diversity of
uses for which the CDFI award was acquired. Not all of the credit unions had
the goal of increasing loans or loan products. Also, many of the credit unions
were not overly loaned out to begin with and so the award money could not
quickly be turned into loans.
3. NCUA reports a 1.81% delinquency as a percent of total loans for lowincome credit unions at year-end 1999. All federally insured CUs do only
slightly better, with a 0.75% ratio. Given the aggressive nature of the CDFI core
awardees, the delinquency rate is not that poor. See NCUA, 2000, p. 16.
4. Homesteaders (delinquency growth of 149%) has an odd pattern of charging off a large amount of loans every other year, which has the effect of decreasing the amount of delinquent loans. In 1999 they charged off a large amount and
consequently had a low amount of delinquent loans, which jumped back up in
2000. This indicates a pattern of bad loans; however, the growth change in
absolute terms of DL/TL was only 1.9 percentage points: from 1.76% in 1999 to
3.7% in 2000. Unified Singers (107%) had a huge increase from 1999 to 2000 due
to the death of a client of which they were not aware. The insurance payments
are still being arranged, but it is now in the process of being paid off fully. Gross
loans charged off have remained zero for the entire period (with total loans outstanding at 1.1M). The one bad loan raised the DL/TL ratio to 2.41%. School
Worker’s (62%) total delinquency has been rising steadily, but not as drastically
as its 62% would indicate. It appears that in 1996 a number of the delinquent
loans were charged off, giving a lower 1996 delinquent loan amount. However,
in 1997, the number jumped back to a level similar to the 1995 amount. The
lower starting amount had the impact of producing an inflated growth rate.
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However, even in 2000, the DL/TL was only 1.38%, more than 1% less than the
peer average.
5. The composite average was calculated by taking the corresponding average nonmember deposit amount for each credit union’s peer group and aggregating it.
6. The three CUs receiving nonmember deposits were Central Appalachia,
$100,000 received in 1998; Alternatives, $850,000 received in 2000; and Appalachian
Development, $500,000 received in 1999. Appalachian Development’s award
represented 35% of their $1.4 million nonmember deposits, whereas Alternatives’
award represented 20% of their $4.1 million and Central App’s award represented
3% of their $3.3 million. Even if the award money is removed, the growth is still
much higher for the awardee group than for their peers.
7. For the majority of the credit unions it was not possible to obtain the
dates when the money was actually dispersed. Many had multiple disbursements
of the award over a 1–2 year period.
8. Bethex was the number six top performing CU in the group, whereas
Quitman fell in the bottom half. However, Quitman has long been recognized
as a good example of rural LICU development and is the subject of a current
Winthrop Rockefeller research project.
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Problems? What Problems?
We Have None at All
Qualitative Data Collection for
Impact Assessment
by Katie Wright
Abstract: Increasing interest in impact assessment of microfinance and
other development interventions highlights the need to understand links
between activities and outcomes in order that programs and services can be
improved. This paper draws out the complexities of using prompting and
open-ended questions in semistructured interviews and also considers entry
points for field research. This is done with reference to a study of the
impact of microfinance on women in poor areas of Cajamarca, Peru.
Drawing on findings from over eighteen months of fieldwork, it examines
the trials and pitfalls in question design and suggests guidelines for better
practice.

T

his paper highlights the ways in which qualitative data
methods such as semistructured interviews can be used
to produce rich and credible findings on the impact of
microfinance schemes. Drawing on fieldwork conducted over
eighteen months with women living in low-income areas of
Cajamarca, Peru, it argues that careful attention to question
design and entry points is key to gaining rich and useful information on impact.

Journal of Microfinance

In the present climate, development agencies are under
increasing pressure to show that they are listening to those
they purport to serve and that they can demonstrate impact.
With different microfinance institutions competing for clients
in the same locations, it is in their own interests to be responsive to the needs of clients to retain users or broaden outreach
(Cohen, 2001, p. 2). Institutions also need to demonstrate
impact in order to keep funds flowing to their organizations
and to keep jobs in existence (Dichter, 1994, p. 40). Being
accountable to donors has often led to a tendency to hush up
the negative impacts of programs. Most recently however,
NGOs are being encouraged to implement impact-monitoring
systems into their more routine activities in order to listen to
their clients (Woller, 2002) and improve the services they
provide. 1
One advantage of using qualitative methods for impact
assessment is that rather than categories being predefined prior
to the study (as in the quantitative tradition), analytic categories are instead defined during the process of research
(McCracken, 1998, p. 16). Similarly, such methods allow informants to speak in a language which is meaningful to them
(Caro, 1994,. p. 1) and the very richness of the words selected
often provides the researcher with more information relating
to causal linkages. 2 Another strength of this tradition is that
research can also accommodate a wider range of possible
impacts. In this way, at least in theory, there is more room for
identifying and clarifying the causal links, and attribution
becomes easier.
Though a wide consensus exists that qualitative methods
are important, caution is needed, particularly regarding how
questions are framed, ordered, and asked, since this has an
impact on the information given. Attention must also be paid
to minimizing the biases that affect responses. Some questions
Katie Wright is a research ofﬁcer working on poverty alleviation and microﬁnance in
Latin America at the Department of Economics and International Development,
Unniversity of Bath, UK. Email: k.e.wright@bath.ac.uk
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act as prompts by which the researcher introduces new elements or invites responses on a particularly relevant topic. The
problem with this kind of question is that the researcher risks
not allowing the informants to answer using their own
categories but imposes categories based on the researcher’s
own prejudices and in this way taints the response. To overcome this problem, more open-ended kinds of questions otherwise known as “generative narrative questions,” designed to
stimulate the informants to explain their life stories are likely
to leave the informants more free to reveal how things “really
were” in their own terms. At the same time, however, if the
questions are too open-ended, such life accounts may lead to an
inundation of less relevant information, thus increasing the
cost and problems of data analysis. In the final analysis, it
would appear that a trade-off is necessary between the two.
It should be noted that even if the questions are “right,”
much depends upon how information is obtained, the sources
of bias, and the willingness of informants to divulge information. Even the most fundamental methodological problems
such as how the researcher is perceived and how the researcher
perceives the “other,” whether trust is established between the
researcher and informant, and the nature of the power relations that coexist between them, affect and distort outcomes. A
key point here is the recognition that informants do not passively respond to questions; instead they tailor their replies to
choose how to be represented. This may involve lying
(Bernard, 1994, p. 168). This problem has been well illustrated
by Nencel who, in a study of prostitution in Lima, writes:
Many women that work as prostitutes are aware of the
acceptable parameters corresponding to a prostitute. In
other words, they know the difference between a “good”
prostitute and a “bad” one. They tell researchers what they
want to hear. Lies serve to protect themselves, to deny, to
dream and to be accepted. (2000, p. 170)
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Establishing means of minimizing bias is thus important in
order eventually to make claims that are measured and useful
in revealing impact. This paper is thus concerned with creating
guidelines for good practice in using semistructured interviews
in order to reveal impact. It will use field data collected in
Cajamarca, located in the northern highlands of Peru. Case
studies have been selected to emphasize methods that were
employed and how these provided the key to revealing the
kinds of problems experienced by users of microcredit
schemes.

Case Study: Interviews in Cajamarca
Incentives
For this research, Santos, the “gatekeeper,” was a literacy
worker and highly respected in the community. Santos helped
the researcher “recruit” active members on microcredit
schemes and borrowers who had withdrawn through a mixture
of personal contacts and the use of snowballing techniques. 3
The interviews were recorded in a discreet notebook.
Prior to embarking on overseas field research, interviewers
planned to give small gifts to interviewees, as a token of thanks
and goodwill for the time the informants would give up to
speak about their experiences on credit schemes (Robson, 1994,
p. 53). Gift giving is an important part of social life in
Peru (Howard, 1994). Contacts working in NGOs in
Cajamarca indicated that sweets, matches, washing powder,
and soap bars would be most appreciated, and these were taken
in anticipation. 4
Before the researcher began the interviews, Santos and his
wife, Rosa, explained that previous researchers in Porcón had
paid interviewees up to three dollars each and that no one
would now be prepared to talk for a few sweets or a packet of
matches. This put the researcher in a difficult position.
Whereas paying respondents for their time lost while being
interviewed seemed logical, the researcher felt manipulated.
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Local contacts later observed that Porcón was an area that had
traditionally benefited from NGO handouts and that as a
result of this NGO activity the population had become very
astute at extracting money from foreigners. Handling this kind
of viveza (craftiness) is something that researchers should be
conscious of before embarking on fieldwork, since it directly
affects the quality of the information given and thus the
validity of findings. 5
Over time, through contact with other Peruvian
researchers working in the area, it was decided that the only
way to counter the pressure to give money was to turn the situation into a joke. In this way, when people asked the
researcher to buy them a radio, instead of feeling awkward and
uncomfortable, she learned to playact: “Don’t you know that I
am a student just like your son? If I buy you a radio, what
money will I have to live on? You all want to bleed me dry!”
Such teasing related much more to their sense of humor and
resulted in the researcher becoming more respected and
accepted and being able to establish trust more quickly. It soon
became clear that although the respondents appeared to be shy
and reserved, these exchanges were a form of test that would
influence how much information they would be willing to
divulge. Respondents were still given one or three soles
($0.30–0.90) at the end of interviews, the researcher explained
that this was not a payment, but a token of good will, and the
gifts were well received. It is unlikely that these gifts biased the
input obtained.

Recruitment of Informants
The researcher was aware that contacting informants through
NGOs would be something of a double-edged sword. Though
gaining access to existing members would have been straightforward, contacting ex-borrowers would have been far more
difficult since NGOs rarely keep details of these. It might also
have been harder for informants to speak out about injustices
if the researcher were perceived to be linked to an NGO. 6
Though good contacts had been made with NGOs in the area,
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it was instead decided that in this circumstance, it would be
better to contract a local gatekeeper. This method proved to
have many advantages. Santos deftly set up the conversation as
a relaxed chat, explaining clearly to the women that the
researcher was not a government official or there to check up
on them in any way, but was only a student from a country
miles away. By setting up the informal interviews in this way,
it was possible to establish some rapport with the women. It
met more with social modes to meet more informally, in their
houses rather than in an NGO office. Similarly, this provided
the opportunity to joke and to offer incentives that certainly
made the informants more relaxed and open. Any linguistic
problems were overcome by having Santos present.
Access to a gatekeeper who can put informants at ease was
essential for interviewing in a rural context, as not only were
informants initially wary, they also lacked confidence and
were unfamiliar with expressing their opinions and feelings to
strangers. At first, several days were spent with Santos piloting
the questions. The central aim was to find out how well the
microcredit schemes in the area were working in practice.
However, informants initially gave only one-word answers or,
at the best of times, they spoke in mumbled tones. It was especially frustrating when there were groups of women, as they
would often just make jokes among themselves and make fun
of the researcher, rather than answer the questions. In part this
was because they did not feel they knew how to answer and
feared making mistakes in front of each other as well as in
front of the researcher. They were also testing her prejudices.
These problems were largely resolved by the researcher revising her questions in order to gain credibility (see below).

Telling One’s Own Story
Effective interviewing also involves interviewees being able to
pose questions to the researcher. In order that the conversation
would be interesting to the informants, postcards of the
researcher’s own country, England, were passed around, and
the researcher tried to answer questions about her own life and
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research. In general she was asked how English people view
Peru and whether there are credit schemes in England. Despite
this, interviewees were extremely afraid of making mistakes or
that the interview material would be used against them. This
was also observable in their defensive body language (e.g.,
avoiding direct eye contact). It was not enough for the
researcher to reiterate that the interviews would not be used
for exploitative purposes; Santos and Rosa also had to confirm
this. In most cases, their confirmation was enough to let interviewees concede to interview, but even despite the presence of
Santos, some respondents still preferred not to be interviewed
at all.
This poor response to initial interviews was discouraging.
While secondary sources suggested that there were problems
with credit schemes, when this issue was raised, different
women simply responded: “¿Problemas? No señorita. Nosotras
no tenemos ninguno” (“Problems? No young lady, we do not
have any”).

Revising Questions
Santos was consulted, and he suggested that the questions were
in too formal Spanish; he was asked how he thought we should
change our approach. It was decided that Santos should speak
first to establish trust:
We want you to tell us about the loan that you have had.
The foreigner is from England, you know, and she is studying so as that she works with women with loans. But now
she wants to first study if the loan helps women or if it
does not help them at all. When she finishes her study,
when she works, she will know how to help in the easiest
way. And do not worry that she is going to make complaints or is from an institution and is going to speak
badly, do not think this, she wants to know only to study.
Do you agree to tell us something? 7
This introduction served various important functions.
Principal among these was setting the informants at ease and
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explaining clearly the researcher’s reasons for being there.
Assurance of anonymity was given, along with the guarantee
that the information would not be used against informants.
Santos confirmed the researcher’s student status and also
offered an incentive to make the whole interview seem more
lighthearted and informal. This was essential for setting the
scene and conditions in order that the informants could open
up and feel at ease to tell their experiences of microcredit in
their own terms and without fear of reprisals. These assurances
meant more coming from Santos, since he was a respected
member of the community.
The need to rethink did not end there, but extended to the
revision of semistructured questions. Once again, the initial
tests and discussion with Santos revealed the need to revise the
questions in a way that made transparent fewer Western preconceptions.
In Table 1, I show how the interview questions were
rephrased.
This reflected a turning point in the research process and a
key to finding out how well microcredit programs were working in practice. The outcome of these revisions was fuller,
richer, and more plausible answers, and the causal linkages
between events also became clearer. From this moment, interviewing became easier and much more enjoyable.

Findings
Microcredit schemes targeted at women in rural areas are generally based on the solidarity group model, whereby women
participate in income generation activities in a collective group
and are jointly responsible for loan repayment. Due to lack of
collateral, women in the poorest rural sectors do not have
access to individual loans and most have no alternative but to
belong to a group in order to get microcredit.
Though this method of borrowing has been lauded as being
highly effective (Oxfam, 1998), interviews revealed that in the
way that they were run, solidarity group schemes in mothers’
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clubs are unsustainable. The problem was the high incidence of
corruption and self-enrichment by group leaders. Leaders of
mothers’ clubs are elected annually by the other members. The
elected posts are those of the president, secretary, and treasurer. In this way, a hierarchical structure exists in these clubs.
Using semistructured interview techniques it was revealed that
in seventy-three interviews from mothers’ clubs, women
repeatedly explained that the programs had been of no benefit
to them. Only eight of the informants suggested that microcredit had been beneficial to them in some way, while sixtyfive of those interviewed had withdrawn from schemes due to
personal dissatisfaction with they way they were run.
Moreover, they felt that they had been working without
receiving any financial benefit. Thus, they felt so exploited by
the group leaders that the vast majority had withdrawn altogether. The answers to the revised questions revealed the causal
links between events. For example, when question nine was
phrased, “Tell us, what things make you angry, not fights or
screaming matches, but anger?” typical responses included:
The President kept all the money. Even today, the mothers still have not received a thing. They have now changed
the group leaders. They can’t work with credit anymore
because there is no fund left. I withdrew from the group. I
would not take out credit again. (Interview with María,
Porcón Alto, 4 October 1999)
The leaders got all the money. They did not denounce the
President. They don’t want to cause more hassle. If you
criticise, they will attack you, meaning more hassle. They
contradict you. When they didn’t share anything out, I lost
interest. It has not benefited me at all. (Interview with
Julia, Porcón Alto, El Aliso, 2 October 1999)
Nothing. They did not share out anything. With the loan
we bought four arrobas of wheat, we sowed the seeds . . .
for her [the President]. “On such and such a day you must
come and harvest it,” they told us. There was quite a lot of
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wheat. It was seven or eight sacks of it. They did not even
give us a grain of it. My husband said: “Why are you going
just so the President can get richer? You would do better
to help the children, not her.” The group withdrew and
there’s no more support for the club these days, not even
food donations. They were supposedly setting up a place
for the mothers but it’s all for her! She’s a family member,
so they don’t denounce her. (Interview with Concepciona,
Porcón Alto, El Aliso, 2 October 1999)
There was no money. We were working in vain. The
President bought pots and pans, benches and seats for her
house with the profits. It became her property. They do
not want to denounce her. She has threatened them. That’s
how far our work got us and we don’t want to have anything more to do with it . . . we suffered in vain. (Interview
in Porcón Alto, Candelaria, 3 October 1999)
Before, I was really glad—I thought that little by little the
mothers were taking out loans on their own initiative, but
they just work, nothing more. They cheated them by giving only a tiny amount of food and no money. It’s better if
women and men work on the land. (Interview in Porcón
Alto with Candelaria’s husband, 3 October 1999)
Thus it was revealed persistently in interviews that rather than
the dynamic being one of solidarity and group support, the
relation in this case is one of exploitation:
Again and again, washing, dyeing, they demanded we did
everything. We had to find and carry firewood to dye the
material. Loans are a help but it is a pity that the President
takes all the money. She deceived us, and cheated us on
food too, she did not give us any money at all. She kept the
lot. We did not denounce her because of ignorance about
how to go about it. The President shouted at us. She was
very angry. She demanded that we work. She demanded
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everything. (Interview with Julia, Porcón Bajo, 2 October,
1999)
We worked unpaid. . . . We were just a form of labour . . .
nothing more. (Interview in El Aliso, Porcón Alto,
Concepciona, 2 October 1999)

Analysis
In the final analysis, revising the questions carefully led to
fuller, richer, and more credible accounts revealing the casual
links relating to the negative impacts of microcredit in several
ways. First, use of the appropriate language or idiom was significant since it served to simplify and clarify concepts that
might otherwise not have been understood. (See questions one,
three, twelve, and sixteen.) Similarly, the use of colloquial language meant that the researcher appeared to be more aware of
local realities. This indirectly sent the message that though she
was a foreigner, she could not be easily deceived by a minimalist answer as she had insider knowledge.
Rephrasing questions also revealed differences in worldview. For example, the term for a loan (préstamo) was not well
understood and was adapted to the term empréstamo which has
different connotations and is much more understandable in
this rural context. According to the linguist and quechua
speaker, Coombs, whereas préstamo is associated with loans
from a bank, empréstamo refers to loans between individuals
and family members in a region (personal communication,
n.d.). 8 Thus, the concept of a loan in the Western sense was not
as obvious to informants as had been previously assumed.
Interestingly, by contrast, the term préstamo was the most
commonly used term by informants in comparative research in
Lima. This points to rural/urban differences that need to be
taken into account in question design. It also reveals the dangers of using a priori categories. Rewording questions allows us
to narrow the gap between the researcher’s categories and concepts and those of the respondents. 9
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There were inherent biases in some of the initial questions
asked, such as in question five in which the original wording
assumed that the loan had been invested rather than used for
consumption purposes. Rephrasing the question to “What did
you buy with the loan?” minimized this bias. Similarly, the
apparently straightforward question “What problems did you
experience?” (question eleven) had many negative undertones.
Women were sensitive to the suggestion that “they had problems” and this led to a denial that any difficulties existed.
When the question was rephrased to “What made you angry?”
the negative impacts of the scheme were openly revealed. In
this way, the inherent bias in the original question was
avoided, and this allowed women to air their feelings without
feeling patronized. This was the most important generative
question for revealing impact and resolving the problem of
attribution. Rephrasing this question represented a major
breakthrough in terms of this research.
At other times a question needed to be illustrated using references from the local context. In part this showed insider
knowledge. For example, in question fourteen, the wording of
the question subtly indicated an awareness that a husband
might not be in favor of his wife’s taking out a loan. This gave
the researcher credibility, which in turn led to trust. Similarly,
in question eighteen (“When you have money, for example,
when you sell a hen, a guinea pig, or a jumper, who takes the
money, the wife or the husband?”) using examples directly
related to the local reality made it easier for informants to
respond. The aim was to use such questions to get a better idea
of the dynamics of decision making within the couple. 10
Making a joke through careful use of idiom also showed insider
knowledge and established trust such as in question seventeen:
“What else do you do, or do you not even move from your
seat?” This gentle use of humor enabled revealing insights into
other activities that informants might undertake that
they might normally not have been brought to light due to
embarrassment or other reasons such as shyness. Again, such
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impacts could only be teased out using appropriate language or
idiom.
It also became evident that new questions that had not
been considered in the original plan needed to be constructed
(e.g., question ten). Similarly, motivational reasons for attending the mothers’ club needed to be included (question twenty).
One of the advantages of the qualitative tradition is that rather
than questions being established prior to the interview, they
can be adapted and added during the interview process.
The process also allows for contextual analysis. In addition
to the questions themselves, in-depth interviews allow the
researcher to observe and record context, time, place, and
appearance of the setting. It also allows for the observation of
women’s facial expressions (e.g., when the respondent laughed
or looked concerned, confused, or upset) and information
about who was present at the interview and how the informant
reacted to them. All of this information provides much richer
information about context.
To summarize, attention to question design led to evidence
suggesting that, in the way that they were being implemented,
microcredit schemes in this particular area are unsustainable.
The evidence suggested that this negative impact could largely
be attributed to the high incidence of corruption and selfenrichment by the leaders. It could be argued that “corruption”
is too strong a term or that it represents a Western worldview
that is out of touch with that of rural societies. For example,
Howard, a sociolinguistics expert on Andean countries, has
suggested that peasants use patronage and personal networks to
get ahead and that what Westerners term “corruption” in an
Andean context is simply considered a way of life (Howard,
personal communication, n.d.). However, respondents themselves criticized this kind of behaviour and called it “exploitation.” Another argument is that group members may be biased
in arguing that local leaders are only interested in personal
gain, with the result that a successful person or local leader
(such as the president of a mothers’ club) may get a lot of
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criticism and is likely to be distrusted. It is possible that some
of the respondents may have been lying or exaggerating the
truth to defame other members in the community. However,
cross-checking information with NGOs confirmed these suspicions about corruption, as did the interviews with presidents
themselves or their refusal to be interviewed. For example,
when the presidents did concede to interview, many blamed
the members for being jealous of their social position.
However, it was notorious that in the majority of cases presidents declined to be interviewed, suggesting that they did
indeed have something to hide.

Conclusion: Implications for Best Practice
To fully understand how well development interventions are
working in practice, careful attention to question design is
essential. Important issues concern how researchers are introduced, the need to pilot questions and carefully revise the language used, the need to minimize bias, and the need to find
ways of being accepted. These issues will now be considered in
more detail.
Attention to how researchers are introduced is essential
because it affects how they are perceived and the quality of
responses. How questions are phrased affects the willingness of
informants to respond. Thus, the first key principle of good
practice is careful attention to the context in which the interview takes place. That is to say how, when, and where it takes
place. Where possible, it is preferable to draw on the experience of a well-respected local gatekeeper rather than recruiting
informants through NGOs (which often give access only to
their “success stories”). In such a situation, informants are
likely to feel that the researcher may not be free to speak out
about negative impacts for fear of reprisals or the loss of future
benefits for their community. Moreover, the evidence suggests
that local people are reluctant to tell the development agencies
of the problems they experience due to other power relations
and kinship systems at work in the community of which these
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institutions are unaware. By contrast, the use of a local gatekeeper served not only linguistic functions, but also enabled
the researcher to come across as unthreatening. Snowballing
methods also enabled a wider access to borrowers and exborrowers than could have been achieved through NGOs. The
researcher also gained local knowledge, which added to her
own credibility and helped her to become accepted. Together,
these factors improved the quality of the responses obtained
and thus led to a better understanding of the causal relationships of negative impacts.
A second principle of good practice is being prepared to
pilot and subsequently revise questions. This serves several
functions. First, each question is made clearer to suit the local
context. Without this, poor information and limited understanding are likely outcomes. Second, if one can sense that certain things are not being said, such as problems of a program
not coming to light, attention to question design is essential to
unlock these more sensitive issues. It also enables those conducting fieldwork to get a clearer worldview of the informants.
Perhaps what is most revealing about the case study material
from Peru presented in this paper is that in the act of revising
questions, researchers are forced to question their prejudices
and the assumptions that underpin them. This thus serves to
minimize bias in the research process. Use of local idiom
has the added advantage that it gives the impression that
researchers have insider knowledge, which makes them more
credible. Getting the question right also enables them to be
more imaginative and sensitive and more able to establish a
better rapport. For example, gentle use of humor through language can enable them to delve into issues in a light-hearted
manner, allowing the informant to provide richer detail relating to impact and attribution. This opportunity to probe why
informants responded in particular ways (as opposed to looking solely at what the responses were) is another advantage of
semistructured interviews. As highlighted previously, in the
context of microfinance programs these reasons for responding
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ranged from hoping to receive additional benefits, not wanting
to endanger the flow of resources, or not wanting to alter
power relationships.
A third principle is to ask open-ended and nondirective
questions where possible. Similarly, not immediately accepting
the first answer that is said is important in order to check for
fact, opinion, and rumour. It is possible that some informants
wanted to defame members of the community and thus may
have exaggerated their replies or given a half-truth. It is important to be aware that exploitation works both ways and that
attempts may be made to manipulate the researcher. Crosschecking information from other sources, such as through the
presidents of mothers’ clubs, the gatekeeper, an NGO, and
other researchers in the area is thus essential. This process
helps the researcher understand the motives of the respondents
and the wider context in which associations among different
findings occur.
Fourth, how researchers record information depends on
the local context. In the rural context of Porcón, interviewing
women from low-income agricultural backgrounds, taperecording interviews was inappropriate. It would have been
considered extremely threatening. This would have put informants under added pressure and prevented the formation of
trust between informant and researcher. Interestingly, by
contrast, when interviewing in the town center of Cajamarca
or in the capital, Lima, informants were delighted to have their
stories recorded. In general, they felt proud that they had been
selected for interview and that their stories and situation were
important enough for a foreign researcher to take interest in
them. Thus, choosing how to record the detail of what is said,
not said, and observed largely depends on sensitivity to local
context.
In conclusion, if researchers are to find the causal links
related to impact they must do much more than simply extract
information. Obtaining the willingness of informants to help
them with their enquiry is fundamental. This cannot be done
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without gaining credibility themselves. Careful attention to
question design forces researchers to adjust their worldviews
and minimize bias. In the long term the adoption of
these kinds of techniques by researchers will reveal issues
affecting impact, which are at present little understood. These
include group dynamics and power relations in the wider community, which, as demonstrated above, can negatively affect
the operation of development projects. It is only using the
principles of good practice detailed above that they can bring
the real issues and causes and effects to light and make them
understood by practitioners.

Notes
I would like to thank James Copestake, Susan Johnson, Deborah Caro, and
Naila Kabeer for their comments on earlier versions of this article.
1. Some have even gone as far as to argue that there is a need to introduce
systematic internal-monitoring of their programs representing a step beyond
accountability to donors and towards bottom-up accountability (Simanowitz,
2000, p. 11).
2. For example, according to Caro, a woman who answers a question about
decision making with “I do” on a questionnaire and with “I do when my husband
is away in Lima working during six months of the year, but not when he is here”
in response to the interview question provides infinitely more information on
decision-making (Caro, personal correspondance).
3. Using this method, new informants are recruited via existing contacts.
4. Mosley and Hulme have argued that “rewarding interviewees should be
considered to promote data quality and for ethical reasons. (What right have
impact assessors to assume that the opportunity costs of an interview, particularly for poor people are zero?) This can take the form of a social reward, such
as bringing soda water and snacks to share with respondents, or ‘bribery’
(Mosley, 1997, p. 8) where the interviewee is paid in cash for surrendering his/
her time” (Hulme, 2000, p. 90).
5. The term viveza can roughly be translated as being crafty, shrewd, astute,
sharp, deceitful, slippery, duplicitous, or perfidious.
6. This is not to suggest that it would be misguided to use the NGO as an
entry point since in many cases this may be extremely insightful. Rather, it was
decided that in the context of this research, as a social scientist rather than a
development practitioner, researcher should recruit informants independently of
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the NGO to pick up on issues relating to the wider community, and this was
best achieved using a local gatekeeper.
7. “Queremos que nos digas el empréstamo que has tenido. La gringita es de
Inglaterra ¿no? y está estudiando para que trabaje con mujeres con el empréstamo.
Pero ahora quiere estudiar primero si el empréstamo ayuda a las mujeres o si no
ayuda nada. Cuando ella termine su estudio, cuando trabaje, el para que sepa a ayudar lo más fácil. Y no te preocupas que el va a quejar o es de una institución o voy a
hablar mal, no piense en eso, quiere saber sólo para estudiar. ¿Estás de acuerdo que
nos digas algo?” (Santos, 1 August 1999.)
8. David Coombs is a priest that, in addition to being a linguist by training
and a quechua specialist, has lived in the area for a long time and introduced the
researcher to Santos. For an elaboration of his ideas, see Coombs, 1990.
9. This point is well illustrated by Caro, who notes that in surveys “care of
household” as an occupational category may mean one thing to the researcher
and something very different to the respondent. She also adds that understanding of this term among the respondents themselves is likely to vary according to
age and gender. Again, it is maintained that the motives for self-identification in
this category may differ. She concludes that attention must be focussed on
“closely matching the categories used in surveys to sociocultural categories used
by the respondents” (1994, p. 20).
10. Kabeer has criticized Western researchers for being presumptuous in
assuming that they can use quantitative methods to determine the internal
dynamics of household relationships. She suggests “It is highly unlikely that the
subtle and concealed nature of power will reveal itself through the format of a
highly structured questionnaire. It is frequently silences or the absences within
the research encounter, the information that is withheld rather than volunteered, which signal the presence of disempowering relations” (1991, p. 42). One
could argue that the subtle negotiations of power dynamics within the couple
can only ever be truly understood from those within the relationship.
Nevertheless, the task of the qualitative interview is precisely to explore these
dynamics as far as possible in order to understand how people use money and
what kinds of microcredit product would benefit them.
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Table 1. Interview Questions, Original and Revised
Original question in
too academic Spanish
Revised questions
1. Where did you find out
about the idea of taking out
credit?

How did you know to take out
a loan?
Who told you to take out a loan?

2. When did you take out
credit, recently or a long
time ago?

On what date did you take the
loan—recently or years ago?

3. What amount did you
take out?

How much money did you
take out?

4. Was this a group credit or
an individual one?

This loan, did you take it out
in a group or personally?

5. How did you invest the
money?

With this loan, what did you
buy?

6. What did you work in?

What work do you do?

7. How is it going?

What work do you do?

8. Are there profits?

Do you make money or not?
[Here the researcher establishes
if there were profits, how much,
and whether they were shared
between the members or
whether the president took the
lot].

9. Where do you sell?

When you work, these things,
where do you sell them?

10. [No question asked.]

Who takes the money to buy
new things?

11. What problems or difficulties have you had?

Tell us, what things made you
angry, not fights or screaming
matches, but anger?

12. Was there much default
on the loans in the group?

Are there people who do not
want to repay the loans?

13. Would you take out
credit again?

Would you like to take out
credit once more?

Table 1 Cont’d.
Original question in
too academic Spanish

Revised questions

14. What does your husband
think of it?

What does your husband say?
Is he content when you work
with the loan or does he get
annoyed?

15. Do you think the credit
is helpful or is it more of a
worry?

What do you think of the loan?
Do you worry about the loan?
Is it helpful?

16. If your child were to get
ill, where would you pay his
treatment?

If your child is ill, where do
you find money to cure him or
pay for medicine?

17. What other jobs do you
have?

What more things do you do
or do you not move from your
seat? What money do you use
to pay for your children’s
food?

18. Who manages the money
in the household?

When you have money, for
example, when you sell a hen, a
guinea pig or a jumper or any
thing else, who takes the
money, the wife or the
husband?

19. Do you save money apart Do you save up money
from your husband?
separately?
20. [No question.]

Why do you go to the mothers’
club? Do you go to learn or for
food donations?

21. Do your children help.
you?

Do your children help you or
not?

22. Is there anything more
you want to say or ask?

Is there anything else you want
to say or ask?

Table 2. Spanish Interviews Questions, Original and
Revised
Original questions in
Revised questions
too academic Spanish
1. ¿En dónde se enteró de
¿Cómo has sabido para que
que podía sacar un préstamo? saque el empréstamo?
¿ Quién te dijo para que saque
el empréstamo?
2. ¿Cuando sacaron el
préstamo, recién o hace
tiempo?

¿En qué fecha sacastes el
empréstamo - recién o hace
anõs?

3. ¿Cuánto sacaron - qué
monto?

¿Cuánto de plata sacaron?

4. ¿Fue un crédito grupal o
individual?

¿Este empréstamo sacaron en
grupo o personal?

5. ¿En qué invertieron el
dinero?

Con este empréstamo, ¿qué
compraron?

6. ¿En qué están trabajando?

¿Qué trabajos hacen?

7. ¿Cómo les va?

¿Qué trabajos hacen?

8. ¿Tienen gananicas?

¿Ganan o no ganan?

9. ¿Dónde venden?

Cuando trabajan, esos trabajos,
¿en dónde venden?

10. [No question asked.]

¿Quién coge la plata para
comprar cosas nuevas?

11. ¿Qué problemas o
dificultades han tenido?

¿Diganos, ¿en qué cosas
tuvistes cólera, no de peleas ni
de griterías, sino de cólera?

12. ¿Habían morosos en el
grupo?

¿Hay personas que no quieren
repagar el empréstamo?

13. ¿Volvería a sacar un
crédito?

¿Te gustaría sacar de nuevo el
empréstamo?

Table 2 Cont’d.
Original questions in
too academic Spanish

Revised questions

14. ¿Qué opina su esposo?

¿Qué dice tu esposo? ¿Está
contento cuando trabajas con
empréstamo o se molesta?

15. ¿Piensa usted que el
crédito es una ayuda o más
bien una preocupación?

¿Qué piensas del empréstamo?
¿Tú te preocupas con el
empréstamo? ¿Es un ayuda?

16. ¿Si su hijo se enferma, ¿de Si tu hijo cae mal, ¿de dónde
dónde paga el tratamiento?
pagarías para curarle/la
medicina?
17. ¿A qué otros actividades
se dedica usted?

¿Qué cosas haces más o sólo
sentadita vives?
¿Con qué compras para tus
hijos la comida?

18. ¿Quién maneja la plata en Cuando tienes plata, por ejem
la familia?
plo, cuando venden una gal
lina, un cuy o una chompa o
otras cosas más, ¿quién coge el
dinero? ¿El esposo o la esposa?
19. ¿Guardas dinero aparte?

¿Tú guardas dinero aparte?

20. [No question.]

¿Por qué se van a la reunión del
club de madres? ¿Se van para
aprender o por alimentos?

21. ¿Sus hijos le ayudan?

¿Sus hijos le ayuden o no?

22. ¿Hay algo más que quiera ¿Hay algo más que quieres
decir o preguntar?
decir o preguntar?

Book Review
New Directions in Poverty Finance.
By Craig Churchill, Madeline
Hirschland, and Judith Painter
by Stuart Rutherford

H

ere is a book whose modest presentation did not prepare me for the wealth of useful information and
insights inside. My copy of New Directions in Poverty
Finance came while I was preparing a short series of lectures on
microfinance. I needed to check some facts about Village
Banking’s origins and evolution. I found in the preface six
pages of tables, diagrams, and prose that crisply, if somewhat
dryly, summarized almost two decades of Village Banking
experience. This information was just what I needed, and I
found myself reading on.
I realized that my view of Village Banking was outdated.
The original Village Banking institutions (VBIs) believed
they should play only a promotional role in microfinance, supporting groups of women with loan capital only until they
had build up enough mandatory savings for the group to turn
itself into an independent, self-managed, mutually-owned
institution at the village level. I knew from conversations with
Village Banking institutions in the field that much of this was
changing—that many VBIs now aim to retail financial services
on a lasting basis to poor people. But I learned from this book
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that at a meeting in late 2000, VBIs from around the world, by
reflecting on what they still had in common after years of
intense and successful learning on the job, had redefined their
work in terms of its principles rather than its practices. To
record the outcome of that discussion, and to set down guidelines for turning the principles back into good practice, the
institutions commissioned this book.
Their mission hasn’t changed. Their particularly profound
commitment to tackling poverty continues to give Village
Banking its special character. The five new principles described
in the book were selected for their relevance to this mission.
They are deep outreach (the need to reach deep down into
poverty so as to serve the very poor); large scale (reaching the
very poor, not in the hundreds but in the hundreds of thousands); sustainability (covering costs so that the very poor
receive continuing reliable service); client focus (ensuring that
services respond to real demand from the poor); and the need
for a culture of innovation (keeping up the pressure to look for
ever better ways of serving the poor).
You can see why I read on. These aren’t just the principles
of Village Banking, they are important principles that underlie
all microfinance. The book turns out to be a highly practical,
a very readable, and a well-referenced but gratifyingly brief
survey of key issues in contemporary microfinance. It is broad
enough to serve as an introduction for newcomers to microfinance, yet, with its well-chosen casestudies and its treatment
of up-to-the-minute debates like savings mobilization and
microinsurance, is rich enough to stimulate specialists.
Each chapter presents the choices facing practitioners as
they consider how to go about their work, beginning in
Chapter One with perhaps the most fundamental choice they
must make: what type of institution can best serve their
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mission? How well can formal, semi-formal and informal organizations meet the five principles?
Chapter Two tackles scale. How do you increase your
clientele from 10,000 to 100,000? This chapter examines four
keys to growth: adopting a relentless, institution-wide drive
towards scale; reengineering operations; developing the capacity of the back office to support aggressive growth; and adopting fast growth strategies.
There are many tools that can help poverty-focused
MFIs achieve their objectives. Chapter Three, entitled
“Organizational Development,” discusses the use of two of
these: institutional culture and human resource management.
It describes how an MFI might turn its preferred values, attitudes, and behaviors into institutional habits. It also suggests
methods to manage human resources that promote staff loyalty
and maximize productivity, while providing valued services to
the very poor.
In Chapter Four, the focus shifts from the institution to
the customer. It discusses three questions: Are we serving who
we want to serve? Are customers benefiting from our services?
What can we do to serve them better? This of course raises
some of the most contentious issues in modern microfinance—
poverty targeting and impact assessment. Although the authors
are more interested in expanding the readers’ understanding of
the choices available than making those choices for them, they
are not frightened of coming to conclusions. Active targeting is
needed to ensure the very poor are reached. Market research is
a must. And they recommend continuous “impact monitoring”
as a practical alternative to elaborate and costly impact studies.
The second half of the book focuses on products.
Individual chapters on loans, savings, microinsurance, and
nonfinancial services follow an introductory discussion (in
Chapter Five) of how product ideas are conceived and how
they get turned into pilots, and finally into institution-wide
product lines. This introductory chapter exemplifies the
book’s strengths. In just fifteen pages it uses plain English to
Volume 5 Number 1
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blend diagrams, case studies, checklists, and tables into a valuepacked introduction to a complex matter—and then it provides
an excellent bibliography of resources for follow-up.
Get this book; you’ll enjoy reading it. Keep it on your
desk, it’s full of useful references. Don’t lend it to others, for
you may not get it back. Tell them to buy their own.
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